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ABSTRACT 
The reasoning of people with delusions is characterised by a ‘Jumping to 
Conclusions’ (JTC) bias. A meta-analysis of the empirical literature retrieved 54 
effect sizes of the JTC bias from 30 papers. The magnitude of the effects 
implied that JTC is a robust phenomenon. The JTC effect was largest (d+ = .58) 
when measured by the amount of information requested to make a decision on 
probabilistic reasoning tasks. An analysis of methodological and theoretical 
factors which moderated JTC found that defining delusions by diagnosis of 
delusional disorder (d+ = .74) and employing black and white beads (d+ = .87), 
were associated with the largest effects. The degree of variance in effects 
indicates caution when interpreting the findings.  
 
An empirical study investigated JTC in eighty-five non-clinical participants 
divided into high and low paranoia groups. The study aimed to explore the 
impact of task variations on JTC and demonstrate the effectiveness of 
implementation intentions (‘if-then’ plans) in reducing hasty decision-making on 
probabilistic reasoning tasks. Given there was no evidence of JTC in the 
present sample, the findings do not support a role for JTC in the formation of 
delusions. There was a non-significant trend indicating that forming an 
implementation intention increased the amount of information requested. Task 
difficulty and bead colour also influenced the amount of information requested. 
Implementation intentions appeared most effective when the task was difficult 
and paranoia was high. Caution is required in drawing conclusions from these 
findings due to the limitations of the study.       
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SECTION 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The ‘Jumping to Conclusions Bias’ in Delusions: A Meta-Analysis 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The reasoning of people with delusions is characterised by a ‘jumping to 
conclusions’ (JTC) bias. There has been considerable increase in research 
pertaining to JTC in recent years. The present study updated and extended 
previous reviews of the literature by employing meta-analysis to determine the 
magnitude of the bias. From 30 papers, 54 effect sizes of the JTC bias were 
retrieved. The amount of information requested on probabilistic reasoning tasks 
best distinguished the presence of delusions as indicated by a medium-to-large-
sized effect of d+ = .58. The review identified methodological and theoretical 
factors which moderated the JTC bias: definition of delusions; comparison 
sample; type of task; ratio of stimuli and colour of beads. Of these, defining 
delusions by diagnosis of delusional disorder and employing black and white 
beads were associated with the largest JTC effects (d+ = .74 and d+ = .87, 
respectively). Theoretical implications and limitations of the review are 
considered. Caution is required when interpreting these findings given the 
degree of variance in effects and the inability to comment on interactions 
between moderating variables.   
 
Keywords: jumping to conclusions, reasoning bias, delusions, meta-analysis  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Jumping to Conclusions Bias and Delusions 
The formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs involves complex, 
multifactorial, psychological processes including affect, motivation and 
perception (e.g., Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Freeman, 2007). Of these, reasoning 
style has received considerable interest. The ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) 
bias refers to the tendency for individuals with delusions to make decisions 
based on less information than individuals not experiencing delusions, on 
probabilistic reasoning tasks (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine, Gardner, Craigie 
& Gold, 2007; Freeman, 2007).  
 
The most widely adopted method to investigate JTC is the ‘beads task’ (Huq, 
Garety & Hemsley, 1988; Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991). In the classic 
paradigm, participants are shown two jars containing two different coloured 
beads (e.g., red and green). In one jar the proportion of red to green beads is 
85:15; in the other jar the proportion is 15:85, respectively. The jars are 
removed from sight and a predetermined sequence of beads, purporting to 
come from one of the jars, is shown one at a time. Participants are instructed to 
decide which jar the beads are being drawn from.  
 
Different dependent variables have been employed to examine JTC. To explore 
the assumption that people experiencing delusions accept hypotheses on the 
basis of limited evidence, most studies employ the ‘draws-to-decision’ (DtoD) 
measure. A JTC bias is deemed present when individuals with delusions make 
a decision based on less information than a control group. Some authors have 
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employed the stricter criteria of ‘extreme responding’ where JTC is defined as 
making a decision based on one or two beads (e.g., Startup, Freeman & 
Garety, 2008; Garety et al., 2005). Where ‘certainty’ ratings are used, the 
methodology is altered slightly: participants are shown the whole sequence of 
beads and, for each bead, are asked to decide which jar the bead has been 
drawn from and how certain they are of that decision. Mean certainty ratings 
and the number of beads seen before reporting a high level of certainty are 
recorded (e.g., Colbert & Peters, 2002; Peters & Garety, 2006). Some studies 
have used a ‘graded estimates’ variant where certainty is reported on an ordinal 
scale e.g., definitely, almost certainly, probably or no preference (e.g., Young & 
Bentall, 1997).  
 
To explore how readily individuals with delusions alter their hypothesis in 
response to new information two further measures have been employed. 
‘Response to potentially disconfirmatory evidence’ (change in certainty when 
presented with a single bead which potentially disconfirms the initial hypothesis; 
e.g., Garety, et al., 1991; Fear & Healy, 1997) and ‘response to reversal’ 
(change in certainty when the sequence of beads is predetermined to initially 
indicate one jar before shifting to indicate the other jar (e.g., Young & Bentall, 
1997; Langdon, Ward & Coltheart, 2010). 
 
Potential Mechanisms of JTC in Delusions   
The development of different dependent measures was driven by various 
theoretical accounts of the mechanisms underlying JTC and the relationship 
with delusions. For instance, DtoD can be employed to explore cognitive 
accounts. One such account proposes that people with delusions are unable to 
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integrate new information into existing hypotheses therefore make hasty 
decisions to avoid sequential information (Young & Bentall, 1997). Others 
suggest that JTC reduces the amount of cognitive effort needed to complete 
tasks (John & Dodgson, 1994). Alternatively, people experiencing delusions 
may have lower thresholds for accepting hypotheses meaning that they require 
less information to make a decision (‘liberal acceptance’: Moritz & Woodward, 
2005). Measures of response to potentially disconfirmatory evidence are 
employed to examine motivational accounts. For example, a ‘need for closure’ 
suggests that people with delusions cannot tolerate the uncertainty that arises 
from contradictory evidence and so reduce their discomfort by altering their 
decision in line with new evidence (Colbert & Peters, 2002).  
 
Previous Reviews of the Literature  
Garety and Freeman (1999) examined the empirical JTC literature between 
1987 and 1999. Of the eight studies reviewed, they found no support for people 
experiencing delusions having difficulties making probability estimates (i.e., 
which jar the bead came from) when presented with a fixed number of stimuli. 
Studies which employed DtoD as the dependent variable did support the JTC 
bias, but variations existed in the findings. The choice of comparison group 
affected the ability to differentiate groups experiencing delusions from control 
groups. Further, modifying the task to increase the emotional salience of the 
presented stimuli (e.g., positive and negative adjectives) exacerbated the JTC 
bias across experimental and control groups, but this trend was more 
exaggerated in delusional groups. Their findings suggest that the dependent 
measure and type of stimuli employed influence the magnitude of JTC. Garety 
and Freeman (1999, p. 131) conclude that ‘people with delusions [show] a 
META-ANALYSIS OF THE JTC BIAS IN DELUSIONS 
 
[6] 
 
tendency to seek less information to reach a decision but not, when presented 
with information, being unable to use it’. That is, they demonstrate a data-
gathering bias.   
 
Two reviews focused specifically on persecutory delusions (i.e., the belief that 
another person intends to harm the individual; Freeman & Garety, 2000). 
Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood and Kinderman (2001) confirm that JTC 
represents a data-gathering bias and propose that it is one of a number of 
biases which contribute to the development and maintenance of delusions. 
Freeman (2007) reported that all of the 10 studies reviewed demonstrated that 
delusional groups made hastier decisions than control groups. Based on 
evidence of JTC in individuals at risk from developing psychosis and in those 
with remitted delusions, he concurs that the data-gathering style is implicated in 
both the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, neither review was 
able to draw firm conclusions regarding the contribution of JTC specifically to 
persecutory delusions, because few studies only employed a sample 
comprising individuals experiencing persecutory delusions; most studies 
employed mixed delusional samples and failed to report subtypes. 
 
Fine et al. (2007) employed meta-analysis to quantify the conclusions of 
previous authors. In total, 47 effect sizes were extracted from 12 studies. Using 
the Stouffer Z method, data from individual studies were pooled to determine 
whether the combined effects reached significance. This method focuses on 
joint significance, not the magnitude of the effect (Darlington & Hayes, 2000). 
Accordingly, Fine et al. (2007) did not report aggregated effect sizes. However, 
they conducted focused comparisons allowing them to comment on differences 
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between Z values. They found that the effect size for DtoD was significantly 
larger than effects sizes for other dependent measures (draws to certainty, Z = 
3.79; response to potentially disconfirmatory evidence, Z = 3.14; and response 
to reversal, Z = 4.22; all p <.001) supporting a data-gathering bias in people 
experiencing delusions. Consistent with Garety and Freeman (1999), Fine et al. 
(2007) found that when the comparison group was recruited from clinical 
populations the effect size was smaller than when the comparison group was 
drawn from non-clinical populations (Z = 2.16, p <.01).   
 
Fine et al. (2007) also explored whether JTC was specific to delusions or an 
epiphenomenon of schizophrenia (i.e., the consequence of general cognitive 
impairment associated with schizophrenia). The presence of delusions did 
differentiate participants diagnosed with schizophrenia suggesting JTC is not an 
epiphenomenal effect. Further, delusion-proneness was associated with hasty 
decision-making, indicating that JTC contributes specifically to the formation of 
delusions. However, the information needed to analyse the association between 
JTC and individual symptoms of schizophrenia was not reported in the original 
studies. Consequently, Fine et al. (2007) concluded that it was not possible to 
fully support the specificity of JTC to delusions.  
 
Contrary to Garety and Freeman (1999), Fine et al. (2007) found no difference 
in effect sizes when comparing emotionally salient tasks with either neutral (i.e., 
beads) tasks or realistic (e.g., children’s names) tasks, regardless of whether 
the comparison group was clinical or non-clinical. They concluded that JTC is 
pervasive regardless of the type of presented stimuli.  
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Moderators of the JTC Bias 
Reviews of the literature indicate variables which might impact on the presence 
of, or ability to detect, a JTC bias in people with delusions. The definition of 
delusions is important because the extent to which JTC is specific to delusions 
remains unclear (Fine et al., 2007). The majority of JTC studies have employed 
cross-sectional designs (i.e., comparison of participants with and without 
delusions at one time point). Therefore, we can only conclude that JTC is a 
state factor associated with the presence of delusions (Garety & Freeman, 
1999).  
 
The presence of the JTC bias in groups that are not currently experiencing 
delusions (e.g., in delusion-prone individuals) may indicate that the data-
gathering bias is present before delusions occur and is therefore also a trait 
factor in individuals with a vulnerability to experiencing delusions (Freeman, 
2007). Susceptibility to readily accepting anomalous beliefs may indicate that 
the reasoning bias is implicated in the formation of delusions.  
 
Freeman (2007) also argues that if the bias exists in groups where delusions 
are remitted there is further evidence that JTC represents a trait factor because 
the reasoning style is pervasive regardless of the presence of delusions. 
However, Freeman (2007) neglects to consider the possibility that evidence of 
JTC where delusions are remitted could also indicate that the bias develops as 
a consequence of a previous delusional, or psychotic, state or the associated 
experiences e.g., societal stigma or compulsory admission to hospital. Rather 
than reasoning style contributing to the formation of delusions, it possible that 
the experience of delusions impacts on individuals’ subsequent reasoning in 
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that they then make hastier decisions. Given that many studies exploring JTC 
employ samples of people diagnosed with schizophrenia, it is also possible that 
the presence of JTC where delusions are remitted also represents some 
neurocognitive impairment associated with schizophrenia (Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl 
& Rief, 2010; Ziegler, Rief, Werner, Mehl & Lincoln, 2008).    
 
The comparison sample employed may also impact on the JTC bias. For 
example, participants with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) are 
overcautious on probabilistic reasoning tasks possibly due to a disconfirmatory 
reasoning style (Dudley & Over, 2003; Fear & Healy, 1997). Therefore, larger 
JTC biases may be expected when people with delusions are compared to 
people with OCD than when compared with non-clinical samples. Conversely, 
anxious participants perform more similarly to participants experiencing 
delusions possibly because they both demonstrate attentional biases to threat-
related stimuli and perceive threat in neutral stimuli (e.g., Garety et al., 1991; 
Bensi & Giusberti, 2007; Dudley & Over, 2003). Consequently, employing a 
comparison sample comprising people with anxiety may mask a true JTC effect 
or reduce the size of the effect.   
 
Further, the dependent measure of JTC has been shown to influence the ability 
to detect the bias (Fine et al. 2007). Related are the type of task adopted (i.e., 
neutral, emotionally/socially salient or realistic) and task difficulty as determined 
by the ratios in which stimuli are presented. Both variations have been shown to 
impact on the hastiness of decision-making, though the findings are not 
conclusive (e.g., Dudley, John, Young & Over, 1997a; Dudley et al., 1997b; 
Fine et al., 2007). Further, if JTC is related to general cognitive difficulties 
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associated with schizophrenia then the presence of a memory aid might reduce 
the size of the bias (Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, McKenna & McCarthy, 2006). 
  
The colour of the beads employed in the classic paradigm varies across 
studies, although most have used either black and yellow or red and green 
beads (e.g., Garety et al., 1991; Moritz, Woodward & Lambert, 2007). Although 
not previously considered in the literature, the colour of beads potentially 
influences the JTC bias. Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman and Meinhardt (2007) 
proposed that colours have psychological connotations. Through repeated 
experiences of perceiving colour, learned associations develop. For instance, 
red is often associated with danger and therefore caution (e.g., traffic lights, 
warning signs) while green is associated with openness and space (e.g., fields). 
Therefore, colour is assumed to impact on motivation and attention. Avoidance 
motivation, and a narrowed field of attention, is likely to occur where colour is 
associated with danger, while approach motivation, and a widened field of 
attention, occurs where colour is associated with more benign environments 
(Elliot et al., 2007; Mehta & Zhu, 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the impact of 
colour on motivation and attention has been found to affect performance on 
cognitive tasks (e.g., Elliot & Maier, 2007; Mehta & Zhu, 2009; Smeesters & Liu, 
2011).   
 
The Present Meta-Analysis 
This meta-analysis aims to expand upon previous reviews by updating a meta-
analysis of experimental studies employing probabilistic reasoning tasks to 
explore the JTC bias in people experiencing delusions (Fine et al., 2007). The 
number of studies included in previous reviews has ranged from eight (Garety & 
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Freeman, 1999) to 12 (Fine et al., 2007) indicating that the evidence base 
relating to data-gathering biases associated with delusions was modest. 
Clearly, there are potential difficulties in drawing inferences from such a small 
literature and therefore an update was deemed timely.  
 
However, to conduct another narrative review of the literature could be criticised 
for lacking scientific rigour in extracting data and being vulnerable to bias due to 
inherent subjectivity (Greenhalgh, 2006). Moreover, by using the Stouffer Z 
method, Fine et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis focused on identifying combined 
significant effects across studies, but did not calculate the size of these effects. 
Lipsey and Wilson (2001) argue that the advantage of employing meta-analysis 
is the capacity to reflect on the magnitude and strength of significant outcomes. 
Therefore, the present review will also expand the previous meta-analysis by 
considering the size of effects in the JTC literature.   
 
More specifically, the primary aim of the present review was to investigate 
which measures of reasoning may best distinguish people who do and do not 
experience delusions. It was of particular interest as to whether the present 
meta-analysis replicated previous findings suggesting that DtoD, and therefore 
the amount of information requested, best characterises the JTC bias in 
individuals experiencing delusions. Further meta-analyses will then examine 
whether theoretical or methodological characteristics of the studies (e.g., colour 
of the beads, the type of sample employed) moderate the size of the effect. By 
systematically exploring such variables, the present study aims to (a) clarify 
discrepancies identified in previous reviews, (b) consider theoretical implications 
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of how JTC relates to delusional experiences, and (c) describe implications for 
the design of future studies examining the JTC bias.  
 
METHODS 
 
Selection of Studies 
Figure 1 presents the process of selecting studies for inclusion in the meta-
analysis. Eligible studies were identified electronically through PsycINFO and 
Medline databases up to April 2011. Only English language published studies 
were included. Search terms had to be present in either the study title or 
abstract and included jumping to conclusions, reasoning, delusions, data-
gathering bias and beads task. Further, the reference list of recent studies 
(defined as those published in the last five years) and that of Fine et al. (2007) 
were reviewed to identify any publications which had not emerged through the 
electronic search.  
 
The inclusion criteria were: (a) the presence of a delusional experimental group 
and a non-delusional control group. This criterion was wider than that of Fine et 
al. (2007) as both clinical and non-clinical, delusion-prone, participants were 
included as experimental groups. This is consistent with a continuum 
perspective of psychotic experiences that allows inferences to be made about 
clinical experiences based on the study of non-clinical samples (Myin-Germeys, 
Krabbendam & van Os, 2003); (b) employment of the ‘beads task’ methodology 
or an adaptation that remained consistent with the probabilistic principles of the 
paradigm; and (c) employment of at least one of the dependent variables of 
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interest: DtoD, certainty ratings, response to potentially disconfirmatory 
evidence or response to reversal.          
 
When reviewing study abstracts, the following exclusion criteria were: (a) 
duplicate studies; (b) unpublished studies. As published studies are easier to 
locate, unpublished studies were excluded for convenience. Further, it could be 
argued that unpublished studies lack methodological rigour resulting in larger 
individual effect sizes which would artificially inflate the aggregated effect size; 
(c) studies of reasoning unrelated to the delusional continuum.  
 
Full-text papers were subsequently read. Further exclusion criteria included the 
method diverging too far from probabilistic principles to be comparable, and 
review papers. Consistent with the primary aim of determining which dependent 
variable best distinguishes people with and without delusions, studies without a 
comparison group were also excluded.    
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Diagram removed in concordance with copyright legislation. 
 
Figure 1: PRISMA flow diagram of the selection of studies for the meta-analysis 
(adapted from: Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman & The PRISMA Group, 2009) 
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The search revealed 30 papers eligible for inclusion in the meta-analysis. When 
compared with the number of studies included in previous reviews, the result of 
present search is indicative of the considerable interest in the JTC bias and 
expansion in this area. The increase is particularly notable given that previous 
reviews included correlational studies, 21 of which were excluded from this 
review. Of Fine et al.’s (2007) 12 studies, 10 were included in this meta-
analysis. One was excluded because there was no comparison group while the 
second was an unpublished study.   
 
Meta-Analytic Strategy 
Coding the Studies 
Study characteristics that may contribute to variation in the JTC effect were 
coded by the author. The coding scheme was informed by both theoretical and 
methodological factors, and comprised the following variables: 
(a)  Sample size for the experimental (NE) and control (NC) groups. 
(b) The effect size for differences between the experimental and control 
groups for each dependent variable (see below for meta-analytic 
approach). 
(c) Definition of delusions: schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder; mixed 
psychotic diagnoses (including schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder, 
bipolar disorder, delusional disorder); delusional disorder; first-episode 
psychosis and delusion-prone.   
(d) Nature of the control group: clinical (including depression, anxiety and 
psychosis without current delusions) or non-clinical.  
(e)  Dependent variable: DtoD, certainty, response to potentially 
disconfirmatory evidence or response to reversal.  
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(f) Type of beads task: original, socially/emotionally salient or realistic/novel. 
(g) Ratio of stimuli in the task: 85:15, 60:40 or multiple ratios comprising 
more than two ‘jars’ of beads e.g., 44:28:28 (Broome et al., 2007). 
(h) Presence of a memory aid. 
(i) Colour of beads where the original paradigm was employed: Red/Green, 
Black/Yellow and Black/White.    
  
Extracting Effect Sizes 
From 30 papers, 54 effect sizes were extracted across the four dependent 
measures of JTC (Table 1). DtoD was the most widely adopted dependent 
variable with effect sizes calculated from 28 studies (93.3%). Just under half of 
the studies (n = 13, 43.3%) employed certainty ratings, while response to 
potentially disconfirmatory evidence and response to reversal were less 
frequently adopted with eight (26.7%) and six (20%) studies employing these 
dependent variables, respectively. 
  
In terms of validity, meta-analysis assumes independence between samples. To 
avoid violating this assumption and introducing bias into the overall aggregated 
effect size, attempts were made to ensure data from the experimental groups 
were used only once when extracting effect sizes. Accordingly, where studies 
recruited more than one control group, the data from the non-clinical sample 
were used to calculate the effect size. Non-clinical samples were the most 
frequently adopted control group in the studies. Furthermore, given that 
reasoning may vary by clinical presentation, it was assumed that non-clinical 
samples would be more homogenous therefore introduce less variability into the 
aggregated effect size. 
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For the initial meta-analysis, effect sizes were calculated for each dependent 
measure. However, mean effect sizes were calculated where a number of tasks 
were completed (e.g., neutral and emotionally salient) and across ratios. 
Moderator analysis comprised further meta-analyses of individual effect sizes 
relating to these study characteristics (e.g., type of task, ratio).     
 
Where the information needed to calculate the effect size (i.e., mean and 
standard deviation) was not reported, an estimate was made based on the 
reported significance level. If the finding was non-significant a conservative 
effect size of d = .00 was assumed. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 1 
Study characteristics and effect sizes for measures of JTC included in the meta-analysis 
  
Sample 
 
  
Effect Size (d) 
 
Author(s) (year) 
 
Experimental 
 
NE 
 
Control 
 
NC 
  
DtoD 
 
(k = 29) 
 
 
Certainty 
 
(k = 14) 
 
Disconfirm. 
Evidence 
(k = 7) 
 
Reversal 
 
(k = 6) 
 
Brankovic & Paunovic (1999) 
 
 
Schizophrenia 
 
29 
 
Non-clinical 
 
35 
    
-0.72 
 
Broome et al. (2007) 
 
At risk mental state 35 Non-clinical  23  0.50 a    
Colbert & Peters (2002) 
 
Delusion-prone 34 Non-clinical 34  0.80 0.29 -0.63  
Colbert, Peters & Garety (2010) First-episode psychosis  
 
17 Non-clinical  35  -0.26 a    
Conway, Bollini et al. (2002)* 
 
Delusional Disorder 10 Non-clinical 10  0.92    
Corcoran et al. (2008) Various diagnoses  
 
39 Non-clinical 33  0.71 a    
Dudley et al. (2011) First-episode psychosis  35 Psychosis (no current 
delusions) 
49  0.03 a    
Dudley, John, Young & Over (1997a)* Various diagnoses 
 
15 Non-clinical 15  0.93a    
Dudley, John, Young & Over (1997b)* 
 
Various diagnoses   12 Non-clinical  12  1.39 a   0.42 a 
Fear & Healy (1997)* 
 
Delusional Disorder 22 Non-clinical 30  0.94 0.17 -0.82 0.00 
Fraser, Morrison & Wells (2006) Schizophrenia / 
Delusional Disorder  
15 Non-clinical 15  0.50 a    
Freeman, Pugh, et al. (2010) Current persecutory 
delusions 
30 Non-clinical 30  0.56    
Garety, Hemsley & Wessely (1991)* Delusional Disorder 
 
14 Non-clinical 14  0.72  0.95 0.16 
Huq, Garety & Hemsley (1988)* Schizophrenia  
 
15 Non-clinical 15  0.97 0.94   
Keefe & Warman (2011) Delusion-prone 
 
67 Non-clinical 66  0.00 c 0.40 a   
Langdon, Ward & Coltheart (2010) Schizophrenia / 
schizoaffective disorder 
 
35 Non-clinical 34  0.68 0.08 0.97b 0.39 
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Author(s) (year) 
 
Delusional 
 
NE 
 
Control 
 
NC 
  
DtoD 
 
 
 
Certainty 
 
 
 
Disconfirm. 
Evidence 
 
 
Reversal 
 
 
 
Lincoln, Salzmann, et al (2011) 
 
Non-clinical high 
paranoia 
 
32 
 
Non-clinical 
 
31 
  
   0.53 
 
0.54 
  
Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl & Rief (2010) Current delusions 
 
44 Non-clinical 68  0.43 a    
McKay, Langdon & Coltheart (2007) Various diagnoses 
 
22 Non-clinical 19  0.37 0.86   
Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, et al (2006)* Schizophrenia  
 
18 Non-clinical 18  0.33 a    
Moore et al. (2006) Late-onset psychosis 
 
29 Non-clinical 30  0.27    
Moritz & Woodward (2005)* Schizophrenia  
 
17 Non-clinical 17  0.80  0.49  0.52 
Moritz, Woodward & Lambert (2007) Schizophrenia 
 
37 Non-clinical 37  0.56 a 0.47   
Peters & Garety (2006)* Various diagnoses  
 
23 Non-clinical 36  0.43 a -0.73 a 0.87  
Peters, Thornton, Siksou, et al (2008) Psychosis  21 Psychosis (no current 
delusions) 
16  0.39 -0.43 -0.15  
So, Freeman & Garety (2008) First-episode psychosis 
 
30 Non-clinical 30  0.59 a    
Startup, Freeman & Garety (2008) Current persecutory 
delusions 
28 Non-clinical 
 
30  0.48    
Warman (2008) Delusion-prone 
 
35 Non-clinical 35  0.15b 0.55   
White & Mansell (2009) Delusion-prone 
 
17 Non-clinical 22  3.26    
Young & Bentall (1997)* Schizophrenia/ 
Delusional Disorder 
 
20 Non-clinical 20   0.51 a -0.86 a -0.67 a 
* Included in Fine et al. (2007) 
a Mean effect size across tasks 
b
 Effect size estimated from probability  
c Assumed conservative effect size  
[19]
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Meta-analytic Approach 
The unbiased effect size estimator d was employed for the meta-analysis 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Effect size d was calculated using the formula: 
 
 
d = 
 
 
x1 - x2 
(sd1 + sd2)/2 
where x1 = mean of experimental (delusional) sample, x2 = mean of control 
sample, sd1 = standard deviation of experimental sample and sd2 = standard 
deviation of control sample. The calculations were conducted using the META 
program (Schwarzer, 1988). A random effects model was employed because it 
allows for the possibility that there are multiple true effects which differ between 
studies due to variations in, for example, sample, task or experimental 
manipulation (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2009). Sample-
weighted average effect sizes (d+) were interpreted using Cohen’s (1992) 
guidelines: d = .20 constitutes a small effect size, d = .50 a medium effect size 
and d ≥ .80 a large effect size.     
 
RESULTS 
 
Comparison of the dependent measures of the JTC bias  
The initial analysis explored the difference between participants with and 
without delusions for each of the dependent variables commonly employed to 
measure JTC. Figure 2 presents the range of effect sizes (d) for each 
dependent measure.  
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DtoD 
 
Certainty 
 
Disconfirm. 
Evidence 
 
 
Reversal 
Stem Leaf Stem Leaf Stem Leaf Stem Leaf 
-0.8  -0.8  -0.8 62 -0.8  
-0.7  -0.7 3 -0.7 2 -0.7  
-0.6  -0.6  -0.6 3 -0.6 7 
-0.5  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  
-0.4  -0.4 3 -0.4  -0.4  
-0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  
-0.2 6 -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  
-0.1  -0.1  -0.1 5 -0.1  
-0.0  -0.0 8 -0.0  -0.0  
0.0 03 0.0 8 0.0  0.0 0 
0.1 5 0.1 7 0.1  0.1 6 
0.2 7 0.2 9 0.2  0.2  
0.3 379 0.3  0.3  0.3 9 
0.4 338 0.4 079 0.4  0.4 2 
0.5 003669 0.5 145 0.5  0.5 2 
0.6 8 0.6  0.6  0.6  
0.7 1 0.7  0.7  0.7  
0.8 00 0.8 6 0.8 7 0.8  
0.9 2347 0.9 4 0.9 57 0.9  
1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  
1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  
1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  
1.3 9 1.3  1.3  1.3  
.  .  .  .  
.  .  .  .  
3.2 6 3.2  3.2  3.2  
 
Figure 2. Stem-and-leaf plots of effect sizes (d) for the dependent measures 
 
Stem digits represent the ones and tenths of effect size places. Leaf digits are 
the hundredths places. Multiple leaf digits reflect multiple effect sizes (e.g., 0.33, 
0.37, 0.39). 
 
 
Table 2 shows the sample-weighted effect sizes (d+) for the dependent 
measures. Effect sizes for DtoD ranged from -.26 to 3.26 with a standard 
deviation (SD) of .60. The significant overall sample-weighted effect size of d+ = 
.58 (p <.001) is considered medium-sized according to Cohen’s (1992) criteria. 
Measures of certainty had a small-to-medium-sized effect (d+ = .30) with effect 
sizes ranging from -.73 to .94 (SD = .46); again the size of the effect was 
significant (p <.01). Effect sizes ranged from -.86 to .97 (SD = .89) for response 
to potentially disconfirmatory evidence and from -.67 to .52 (SD = .43) for 
response to reversal. Effect sizes for both the latter dependent measures were 
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considered small at d+ = -.04 for response to potentially disconfirmatory 
evidence and d+ = .13 for response to reversal and neither were significant.  
 
Table 2 
Effect sizes for the dependent measures of the JTC bias 
Dependent 
Measure 
N k Q d+ 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
DtoD 
 
 
 
1558 
 
28 
 
64.01* 
 
.58* 
 
.36 to .80 
Certainty 
 
770 13 27.85** .30** .06 to .55 
 
Disconfirm. 
Evidence 
 
380 
 
7 
 
56.11* 
 
-.04 
 
-.70 to .62 
 
Reversal 
 
 
253 
 
6 
 
8.88 
 
.13 
 
-.21 to .47 
    * p <.001, ** p <.01 
 
 
Moderator Analysis 
The homogeneity statistic indicated that there was no significant variation in the 
effect sizes for response to reversal, Q (5) = 8.88, ns, suggesting that any 
variance could be accounted for by sampling error alone (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). However, the homogeneity statistic was significant for the remaining 
three dependent measures: DtoD, Q (27) = 64.01, p <.001; certainty, Q (12) = 
27.85, p <.01; response to potentially disconfirmatory evidence, Q (6) = 56.11, p 
<.001. This indicates that the sets were heterogeneous and that variation in 
effect sizes was due to factors others than sampling error alone. Additional 
meta-analyses focused on exploring whether a number of theoretical or 
methodological moderators contributed to the variation.  
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Although both certainty and response to potentially disconfirmatory evidence 
sets were heterogeneous, the total number of effect sizes (k = 13 and 7, 
respectively) were insufficient to allow further moderator analysis. Additionally, it 
was deemed more relevant to focus on variation in the DtoD set of effect sizes 
given that this emerged as the measure that best differentiates between the 
presence and absence of delusions. The following moderators were examined: 
definition of delusions; type of comparison group; task type; bead ratios and 
colour of beads.  
 
Unfortunately, due to insufficient data, it was not possible to include memory 
aids in the moderator analysis. Although eight studies reported the presence of 
a memory aid and two specifically reported not employing a memory aid, the 
remainder failed to report any information.  
 
Definition of Delusions 
Table 3 presents the sample-weighted effect sizes for the difference between 
participants with and without delusions according to the definition of delusions 
employed. Delusion proneness had the largest effect size at d+ = .88. According 
to Cohen’s (1992) criteria the size of this effect was large. However, the effect 
only approached significance (p = .06) while the homogeneity statistic, Q (4) = 
39.31, p <.001, indicated a large degree of variation within the set. When 
delusions were defined by first-episode psychosis the effect was small-to-
medium-sized, but, again, did not quite reach significance (d+ = .29, p = .06). 
 
All sets of effect sizes, except delusion proneness, were homogeneous. 
Accordingly, with a significant effect size approaching large magnitude of d+ = 
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.74 (p <.001), defining delusions by diagnosis of delusional disorder appeared 
to best differentiate between experimental and control groups in terms of JTC. 
Where the experimental group comprised participants with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, or mixed diagnoses (including 
schizophrenia) the effect sizes were of medium magnitude (d+ = .51 and d+ = 
.58; both p <.001). 
 
Table 3 
Effect sizes by definition of delusions 
Definition of 
Delusions 
N k Q d+ 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
Schizophrenia 
/Schizoaffective 
  
 
272 
 
5 
 
2.21 
 
.51* 
 
.27 to .76 
Mixed psychotic 
diagnoses 
 
529 10 7.25 .58* .39 to .76 
Delusional 
Disorder 
 
110 3 .87 .74* .35  to 1.13 
First-episode 
psychosis 
274 5 8.03 .29 -.09 to .20 
 
Delusion-prone 
 
 
373 
 
5 
 
39.31* 
 
.88 
 
-.26 to 2.02 
      * p <.001 
 
Type of Comparison Group 
Of the 30 papers included, 11 employed both clinical and non-clinical 
comparison groups (Table 4).  Statistical comparison of the control groups was 
not conducted as this would involve using data from the experimental groups 
more than once, thereby violating the independence assumption. However, the 
data indicate that the size of the JTC effect was slightly smaller when the 
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comparison group was a clinical sample (M = .68) compared to a non-clinical 
sample (M = .72).  
 
Effect sizes for the clinical comparison groups ranged from d = .05 to d = 1.28. 
A large effect size was found where participants experienced OCD (d = .96) 
whereas a small effect was found where participants experienced anxiety (e.g., 
d = .28). The impact on JTC when the comparison group comprised depressed 
participants is unclear, because the size of the effect ranged from small (d = 
.08) to large (d = 1.28). 
 
In the non-clinical comparison group, effects sizes ranged from d = .27 to d = 
1.39. With the exception of a comparison with older adults (d = .27) all effects 
were of medium-to-large magnitude. This size of the JTC bias was largest when 
participants were recruited from university staff (e.g., d = 1.39; d = 1.02).  
  
  
 
Table 4 
Effect sizes by comparison group 
 
 
 
 
Italics denote diagnosis using Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)  
GAD: Generalised Anxiety Disorder; PTSD: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
 
 Clinical 
 
 Non-Clinical 
Author (s) (Year) Presentation 
 
n d  Recruitment n d 
 
Dudley, John, Young & Over (1997a) 
 
Depression 
 
 
15 
 
1.28 
  
University staff 
 
15 
 
1.39 
Dudley, John, Young & Over (1997b) Depression 
 
12 .97  University staff 12 1.02 
Moore, Blackwood, et al. (2006) 
 
Major depressive disorder 
 
30 .08  Older adult lunch club 30 .27 
Corcoran, Rowse, Moore, et al. (2008) Major depression 
 
27 .55  Advertisement 33 .71 
Peters & Garety (2006) Depression or anxiety symptoms 
 
22 1.05  Psychology department participants pool 36 .43 
Garety, Hemsley & Wessely (1991) Anxiety:  
GAD, agoraphobia, specific phobia 
14 .28  Hospital staff 14 .72 
Fraser, Morrison & Wells (2006) Panic disorder 
 
15 .58  General population, informal contacts 15 .65 
Fear & Healy (1997) 
 
OCD 
 
26 .96  Hospital staff and family/acquaintances  30 .94 
Huq, Garety & Hemsley (1988) Mixed psychiatric:  
Depression, Manic-Depression, phobia, anxiety, 
eating disorder 
10 .91  Information not available 15 .97 
Moritz & Woodward (2005) Mixed psychiatric inpatients: 
Agoraphobia/panic, depression, PTSD, 
personality disorder, social phobia 
28 .77  Hospital staff, general population 17 .80 
Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, et al. (2006) Schizophrenia (non-deluded) 
 
16 .05  Health care/university staff 16 .68 
 Mean Effect Size  .68  Mean Effect Size  .72 
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Type of Task 
Table 5 presents the 34 sample-weighted effect sizes for three types of tasks 
employed to explore JTC. The classic beads paradigm had a medium-to-large-
sized effect of d+ = .60 (p <.001) compared to a small-to-medium-sized effect of 
d+ = .30 (p <.05) for the socially/emotionally salient task. The effect size of d+ = 
.33 for realistic/novel tasks was not quite significant (p = .06) but this was the 
only paradigm that had a homogeneous set of effect sizes (Q (3) = 4.49, ns).  
 
Table 5 
Effect sizes according to task type 
Type of Task N k Q d+ 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
Beads task 
 
 
 
1365 
 
24 
 
61.52* 
 
.60* 
 
.35 to .86 
Socially/emotionally 
salient 
 
277 6 10.88** .30 -.08 to .06 
Realistic/novel 202 4 4.52 .33 -.09 to .74 
 
      * p <.001, ** p <.05 
k > 28 because individual effect sizes were averaged across tasks in the 
initial analysis; one study was excluded because individual task data 
were not reported. 
 
 
Ratio 
Sample-weighted effect sizes indicate that the size of the JTC bias was similar 
when information was presented in ratios of 85:15 (d+ = .47, p <.001) and 60:40 
(d+ = .43, p <.001; Table 6). Multiple ratios had the largest significant effect size 
(d+ = .58, p <.001) and was the only homogeneous set (Q (3) = .86, ns). 
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Table 6 
Effect sizes according to ratio of stimuli 
Ratio N k Q d+ 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
85:15 
 
 
688 
 
14 
 
29.67*** 
 
.47* 
 
.22 to .71 
60:40 
 
854 14 25.87** .43* .22 to .64 
Multiple ratios 
 
278 4 .86 .58* .34 to .83 
* p <.001, ** p <.01, *** p <.005 
k > 28 because individual effect sizes were averaged across ratios in the 
initial analysis; one study was excluded because individual ratio data were 
not reported. 
 
 
Colour of beads 
Of the 24 papers that employed the beads task, the colour of the beads 
employed was not reported in five papers. Six studies used different colours 
to those identified for coding (e.g., pink and blue; Keefe & Warman, 2011). 
However, there was insufficient data to constitute separate groups. In total, 
15 studies contributed to the analysis (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 
Effect sizes according to colour of beads 
Colour of Beads N k Q d+ 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
Red/Green 
 
 
325 
 
5 
 
5.41 
 
.39** 
 
.13 to .67 
Black/Yellow 
 
399 7 6.66 .67** .46 to .87 
Black/White 
 
194 3 6.23 .87* .27 to 1.48 
* p <.01, ** p <.001  
 
META-ANALYSIS OF THE JTC BIAS IN DELUSIONS 
 
[29] 
 
All effect size sets were homogeneous indicating that effect sizes did not vary 
more than would be expected from sampling error alone. Furthermore, all effect 
sizes emerged as significant. With the largest effect size, black and white beads 
had a large JTC effect (d+ = .87) suggesting these colours best distinguished 
between participants with and without delusions. Employing red and green 
beads only resulted in a small-to-medium-sized effect (d+ = .39). The effect of 
JTC was medium-to-large-sized where black and yellow beads were employed 
(d+ = .67).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The initial analysis compared the dependent measures commonly employed in 
the JTC literature. Consistent with the previous meta-analysis (Fine et al., 
2007), DtoD had the largest, significant, effect size. Although Fine et al. (2007) 
did not report the magnitude of aggregated effect sizes, they presented the 
distribution, and median, of individual study effect sizes in a box-plot. Visual 
inspection of these data indicate that the average effect, using DtoD, was 
approximately double the size (Mdn g ≈ 1.00) of the average effect in the 
present review (Mdn d = .56). Because the effect size estimator, g, tends to 
overestimate effect sizes, we might expect the unbiased effect size estimator, d, 
to be smaller (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). However, the discrepancy between effect 
sizes may also reflect variation between studies, as indicated by the significant 
homogeneity statistic for DtoD in the present meta-analysis. Variation may be 
due to the increased number of studies included in the present review.  
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Comparison of the remaining dependent measures did not reveal such large 
discrepancies, possibly because there has not been as large an increase in the 
number of studies employing these measures compared to DtoD. The median 
certainty ratings in the present study (d = .44) were similar to that of Fine et al.’s 
(2007), g ≈ .40, while their median effect size for response to potentially 
disconfirmatory evidence (Mdn g ≈ .50) was comparable to the present study 
albeit in the opposite direction (Mdn d = -.39). Effect sizes for response to 
reversal were only slightly smaller in this meta-analysis (d = .28 vs. g ≈ .35).  
 
Overall, the findings suggest that the most prominent characteristic of JTC is 
the tendency to request less information in decision-making, consistent with 
Garety and Freeman’s (1999) conclusion that JTC represents a data-gathering 
bias. Further, DtoD is the measure that best distinguishes between participants 
with and without delusions in their performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks. 
The dependent measure employed reflects the theoretical account of interest. 
Although the present findings do not provide direct support for any theoretical 
account they also do not discredit accounts which rely on DtoD (e.g., 
impairments in sequential processing or liberal acceptance; Young & Bentall, 
1997; Moritz & Woodward, 2005). Small effect sizes for both response to 
potentially disconfirmatory evidence, and reversal, suggest that people 
experiencing delusions do not alter their decision in response to contradictory 
evidence much more readily than controls. Therefore, it is unlikely that a ‘need 
for closure’ can account for the JTC bias because it would be expected that 
people with delusions would alter their decision quickly to reduce the discomfort 
associated with uncertainty (Colbert & Peters, 2002).  
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Moderating Variables 
The variability in the effect size for DtoD was addressed by an analysis of 
potential moderators. The samples recruited by studies were considered first. 
Where the experimental group comprised clinical samples, defining delusions 
by diagnosis of delusional disorder was associated with the largest JTC effect. 
When delusions were defined as schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder or 
mixed psychotic diagnoses there was only a medium-sized JTC effect. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the data-gathering bias is specific to 
delusions and not an epiphenomenon of schizophrenia (Fine et al., 2007). 
However, because the information was not reported in the original studies, it 
was not possible to determine whether the JTC exhibited by participants with 
schizophrenia was related only to delusional symptoms or whether it could also 
be related to other symptoms (e.g., cognitive impairments).        
 
The JTC effect was large when delusion-prone participants were employed. 
This is consistent with Fine et al. (2007) who also found a significant effect for 
JTC in delusion-prone participants (Z = 3.89, p <.01). The finding appears to 
support the role of the JTC bias in the formation of delusions. It would be 
tempting to argue that the size of the effect goes some way to address the 
discrepancies between studies considering JTC in the formation of delusions 
(Freeman, 2007). However, the effect did not quite reach significance and the 
large degree of variation in the set indicates caution. It is possible that different 
measures of delusion proneness could account for the variation. However, if 
JTC was associated with the formation of delusions, we would expect similar 
findings among participants with first-episode psychosis. Contrary to this 
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hypothesis, however, the effect was small-to-medium and, again, did not quite 
achieve significance. 
  
The type of comparison group was found to moderate the JTC bias. Consistent 
with previous reviews (e.g., Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine et al., 2007) the size 
of the JTC bias exhibited by participants with delusions was smaller when 
compared to a clinical control group than a non-clinical control group. This 
indicates that the presence of mental health difficulties, other than delusions, is 
also associated with reasoning that differs from that of non-clinical samples. 
Further, it appears that clinical samples reason more similarly to people with 
delusions, that is, they make hastier decisions.  
 
The hastiness of clinical samples may, however, be an artefact of conservative 
reasoning in non-clinical samples (Philips & Edwards, 1966). Certainly, the 
largest effect sizes were found where participants were recruited from non-
academic university staff who may have been more motivated to complete the 
task successfully and therefore requested more information (Fraser, Morrison & 
Wells, 2006). Despite equivocal findings where participants with depression 
were recruited, largely the findings from the clinical samples are consistent with 
existing evidence e.g., more cautious reasoning in people experiencing OCD 
and more hasty reasoning in people experiencing anxiety (e.g., Bensi & 
Giusberti, 2007; Fear & Healy, 1997). Although caution is needed in drawing 
conclusions, this indicates that overall, clinical samples do reason more 
similarly to delusional samples and this is not an artefact of conservative 
reasoning in non-clinical samples.   
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Moderator analysis of task variations revealed several interesting findings. The 
JTC effect did differ according to the type of task employed. When neutral 
stimuli were employed the JTC effect was of medium-to-large magnitude and 
significant. However, only small-to-medium-sized effects were found for both 
socially/emotionally and realistic/novel stimuli and neither effect was significant, 
suggesting that people with delusions request less information on neutral tasks 
than on socially/emotionally salient or realistic/novel tasks. This contrasts with 
Dudley et al.’s (1997b) assumption that increasing the emotional salience of the 
task would exacerbate JTC because people with delusions demonstrate 
attentional and memory biases for self-referent stimuli. Although some studies 
confirmed this assumption (e.g., Dudley et al., 1997b; Fraser, et al., 2006; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999), others have failed to find a difference between 
neutral and emotionally salient tasks (e.g., Colbert, Peters & Garety, 2010; Fine 
et al., 2007; Menon et al., 2006; Corcoran et al., 2008). If emotional salience 
does not impact on decision-making, the findings also contradict theoretical 
accounts which highlight the role of affect in the JTC bias (e.g., Dudley & Over, 
2003).  
 
It is possible that participants find socially/emotionally, and realistic/novel, tasks 
more interesting, therefore put more effort into completing them successfully 
(i.e., make a more informed decision). Further, other task variations (e.g., ratio) 
are known to impact on JTC and, therefore, may interact with the type of task. 
This is consistent with the considerable variation in the set of effect sizes for the 
beads tasks and the socially/emotionally tasks. Consequently, the findings and 
theoretical implications must be viewed with caution.  
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The effect size for all ratios was significant, suggesting that participants with 
delusions request less information than control participants, regardless of the 
difficulty of the task. Contrary to expectations, there was little difference in 
magnitude of the JTC effect between the ratios 85:15 and 60:40 indicating that 
there was no difference in the amount of information requested when the task 
was more difficult. The considerable variability in effect sizes reduces the 
confidence with which inferences can be drawn from these findings. Moreover, 
the effect was slightly larger for more difficult tasks where multiple ratios were 
employed, suggesting some sensitivity to task difficulty. However, the findings 
do indicate that people with delusions are less sensitive to task difficulty than 
previously assumed. This has considerable implications for theoretical 
accounts. For instance, based on participants’ ability to respond appropriately to 
variations in task demand, Dudley et al. (1997a) concluded that JTC was not 
due to impulsivity or indiscriminate responding. Further, theoretical accounts 
have been discounted due to an inability to explain responsiveness to task 
difficulty (e.g., accounts positing impairments in integrating sequential 
information would predict that JTC would occur regardless of task difficulty; 
Young & Bentall, 1997).  
 
Within the moderator analysis, the colour of the beads was the only variable to 
comprise all homogenous sets of effects sizes. The largest JTC effect was 
found where the beads were black and white. Where the beads were red and 
green the magnitude of the JTC bias was smaller. This is likely because the 
learned associations with the colours red and green may impact on motivation 
and attention and, therefore, performance on cognitive tasks (e.g., Elliot et al., 
2007; Smeesters & Liu, 2011). However, further research is needed to 
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understand how colour specifically impacts on JTC. This is particularly 
important where red beads are employed because red can signify both danger 
and attractiveness, therefore has the potential to inhibit and improve task 
performance (Mehta & Zhu, 2009).    
  
Limitations of the Present Study 
The validity of the findings reported is potentially threatened by only using non-
clinical comparison groups. The present study confirmed Fine et al.’s (2007) 
conclusion that when participants with delusions are compared with non-clinical 
controls the JTC effect is larger than when compared with clinical controls. 
Accordingly, the reported effect sizes may be inflated and represent an upward 
bias. However, it could be argued that this is less of a problem than the 
variability that would be introduced by employing clinical comparison groups 
where reasoning is likely to differ according to presentation.  
 
In only including published studies, the present meta-analysis failed to account 
for publication biases (see Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The tendency for studies 
with significant effects to be more readily published, and those without 
significant effects not to be published, was termed the ‘file drawer problem’ by 
Rosenthal (1979). Further, Lipsey and Wilson (1993) note that the effect sizes 
of published studies are generally larger than unpublished studies. 
Consequently, it is possible that the reported effect sizes reflect a further 
upward bias and that the inclusion of unpublished studies may reduce the 
magnitude of effects. Conversely, it could be argued that studies that are not 
published, lack methodological rigour which affects the validity of the findings 
and thereby introduces different biases to meta-analysis. With this in mind, the 
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present study is also vulnerable to limitations in the methodological quality of 
the original studies. For instance, many studies fail to report the impact of 
sample characteristics on dependent variables (Garety & Freeman, 1999). This 
is important given that we do not fully understand how some characteristics 
relate to the JTC bias (e.g., intelligence; Garety, et al. 1991; Mortimer et al. 
1996).  Accordingly, the present study would have benefitted from coding the 
methodological quality of the original studies and incorporating it into the 
moderator analysis to determine the impact on the magnitude of the JTC effect.  
 
The present study only employed one rater to code the original studies. The 
reliability of this procedure would have been vastly improved by having another, 
independent rater also code the studies. In addition to addressing any coder 
biases, a second rater would also have been useful in ensuring the accuracy of 
effect size calculations. 
   
Finally, the amount of variation within the effect sizes for the moderator 
variables does raise questions about the confidence with which inferences can 
be drawn from the present findings. The present study is unable to comment on 
the interactions between moderating variables. For instance, it is possible that 
the ratio of beads or the colour of beads could account for the variation in the 
effect size for the beads task. Alternatively, the type of task could account for 
variations in the effect size for different ratios. Consequently, the present 
findings must be viewed with caution.  
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Further Research 
It is apparent that the ability to detect JTC in people with delusions is influenced 
by a number of methodological factors, therefore the present review has 
important implications for the design of future studies exploring the bias. For 
instance, employing DtoD as the dependent measure is most likely to detect the 
bias. Further, variables which moderate JTC should be considered when 
designing methods and analysing data. The latter point is perhaps most 
important if we are to better understand how methodological variables interact 
and impact on the JTC bias.  
 
The specificity of the JTC bias remains an area of interest. This review 
concludes that JTC is not solely an artefact of schizophrenia and may indeed 
reflect trait and state factors in delusions. However, systematic exploration of 
the association between JTC and other symptoms (e.g., attentional or memory 
difficulties) associated with schizophrenia is still required to conclude the bias is 
specific to delusions. Studies could contribute to this endeavour through more 
comprehensive reporting about samples with schizophrenia (e.g., illness 
duration, cognitive impairments, medication). 
 
Further, the JTC literature has neglected to explore how the bias relates to 
different delusional subtypes (Garety and Freeman; 1999). This is important 
given that McKay, Langdon and Coltheart (2007) suggest that individuals 
experiencing persecutory delusions are more wary and less hasty in decision-
making than people experiencing other types of delusions (e.g., grandiose). If 
differences exist between delusional subtypes, there are important implications 
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for understanding discrepancies in the JTC literature and for psychological 
interventions aimed at generic delusional belief systems.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present meta-analysis of the JTC literature replicated the finding that, with 
a medium-to-large-sized effect, DtoD best distinguishes the presence of 
delusions. The size of the bias was large where delusions were defined by 
diagnosis of delusional disorder (d+ = .74) and where black and white beads 
were employed on the classic paradigm (d+ = .87). The magnitude of the effects 
implies that JTC is a robust phenomenon associated with delusional 
experiences. Further research is needed to disentangle potential interactions 
between moderating factors to better understand the bias.  
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ABSTRACT 
The reasoning of people with delusions is characterised by a ‘jumping to 
conclusions’ (JTC) bias. This study investigated the phenomenon in non-clinical 
participants expressing high levels of paranoia. The aims were to examine the 
impact of task manipulations on JTC and demonstrate the effectiveness of 
implementation intentions (‘if-then’ plans) in reducing hasty decision-making. 
After completing a measure of paranoia, eighty-five participants were allocated 
to high and low paranoia groups before being randomly assigned to one of 
three instruction groups: control, goal intention or implementation intention. 
Probabilistic reasoning was measured by performance on the neutral ‘beads 
task’ and the emotionally salient ‘survey task’. Given there was no evidence of 
JTC in the present sample, the findings do not support the assertion that JTC 
contributes to the formation of delusions or is specific to persecutory subtypes. 
Task difficulty and bead colour influenced the amount of information requested. 
The colour red led to more cautious reasoning, particularly when the task was 
difficult. Although implementation intentions were associated with increases in 
the amount of information requested this was not significant. Implementation 
intentions appeared most effective when the task was difficult and paranoia was 
high. Further research is needed to better understand the impact of task 
variations on JTC, clarify the role of JTC in the formation of delusions and the 
specificity to persecutory beliefs, and to more reliably demonstrate the 
effectiveness of implementation intentions. Caution is indicated when 
interpreting the findings due to limitations of the study.  
 
Keywords: Jumping to Conclusions, Reasoning, Paranoia, Implementation 
Intentions 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Jumping to Conclusions Bias and Delusions 
The tendency for people with delusions to make hasty decisions has been 
termed the ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) data-gathering bias (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). Since the seminal work of Garety and colleagues, numerous 
studies have replicated the finding that people experiencing delusions make 
decisions on the basis of less information than control groups specifically on 
probabilistic reasoning tasks (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; Huq, Garety & 
Hemsley, 1988).  
 
In the classic probabilistic reasoning paradigm, the ‘beads task’, participants are 
shown two jars containing different coloured beads and informed of the relative 
proportion of beads in each jar (e.g., jar A contains 15 yellow beads and 85 
black beads where Jar B contains 15 black beads and 85 yellow beads). Based 
on a predetermined sequence of beads purporting to be drawn from one of the 
jars, participants are instructed to decide which of the jars the beads are being 
drawn from. The JTC bias in people experiencing delusions is defined as either 
fewer ‘draws-to-decision’ than non-deluded comparisons, or as ‘extreme 
responding’ (i.e., making a decision based on two or fewer items of information). 
 
Reviews of the literature concur that JTC is associated with the presence of 
delusions (e.g., Fine, Gardner, Craigie & Gold, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
However, there is less clarity regarding the cause of JTC and the mechanisms 
by which it is associated with delusional beliefs (e.g., Freeman, 2007). 
Motivational accounts suggest, for example, that people with delusions are 
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unable to tolerate uncertainty and so JTC fulfils the ‘need for closure’ (e.g., 
Colbert & Peters, 2002; Freeman et al., 2006). Cognitive accounts posit deficits 
in information processing, such as an inability to integrate sequential 
information into existing hypotheses (Young & Bentall, 1997), or a lower 
threshold for accepting hypotheses (‘liberal acceptance’:  Moritz & Woodward, 
2005; Moritz, Woodward & Lambert, 2007; Moritz et al., 2009). At present, no 
one account can fully explain the JTC bias as attempts to evidence the 
accounts has resulted in inconsistent, discrepant findings.  
 
JTC in Non-Clinical Samples 
A continuum approach to understanding psychotic experiences allows 
inferences to be made about clinical experiences based on the study of non-
clinical samples (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os, 2003). Non-clinical 
samples are advantageous because their reasoning is less likely influenced by 
impairments in cognitive, and social, functioning often found in clinical samples. 
Evidence of JTC in delusion-prone individuals would implicate the data-
gathering bias in the formation of delusions. Unfortunately, the findings are 
equivocal (e.g., Broome et al., 2007; Colbert & Peters, 2002; Linney, Peters & 
Ayton, 1998; Ziegler, Rief, Werner, Mehl & Lincoln, 2008). Having reviewed the 
literature, Freeman (2007) concluded that JTC does exist in delusion-prone 
individuals, but the bias is more subtle than when delusions are present.    
 
Exploration of JTC in non-clinical samples also presents an opportunity to better 
understand how the bias relates to specific delusional sub-types. The results of 
the few studies investigating the association between JTC and persecutory 
(paranoid) beliefs in non-clinical samples are encouraging. To determine the 
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prevalence of JTC in the general population, Freeman, Pugh and Garety (2008) 
found that 20% demonstrated the data-gathering bias. JTC was strongly 
predicted by conviction in paranoid beliefs, and to a lesser extent, by the 
distress experienced. Lincoln, Salzmann, Ziegler and Westermann (2011) found 
that non-clinical participants experiencing high levels of paranoia made 
significantly hastier decisions than those experiencing medium or low levels of 
paranoia. Moreover, Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner and Moritz (2010) found that 
attempts to evoke anxiety increased paranoia and a JTC tendency mediated 
this association. Further studies are required to replicate and determine the 
reliability of these findings.  
 
Impact of Task Variations on the JTC Bias  
Variations in probabilistic reasoning tasks have been employed to explore 
factors which potentially mediate the JTC bias. Evidence of JTC on the neutral 
beads task suggests that the data-gathering bias is generalised and unrelated 
to delusional content (Dudley, John, Young & Over, 1997a). However, people 
with delusions exhibit attentional and memory biases for self-referent and 
delusion-referent stimuli. Accordingly, Dudley et al. (1997b) proposed that 
increasing the emotional salience of probabilistic tasks would exacerbate JTC. 
They found that participants with and without delusions both demonstrated a 
greater tendency to make hasty decisions when the stimuli were emotionally 
salient (i.e., adjectives describing someone similar to themselves), but that this 
was exaggerated in participants with delusions. Subsequent findings have been 
less conclusive. Although Young and Bentall (1997) replicated the finding, 
Warman and Martin (2006) found that the JTC bias was only present when the 
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first stimulus was weighted negatively. Further, a meta-analysis of the evidence 
revealed no effect of emotional salience on JTC (Fine et al., 2007). 
 
The difficulty of the task, manipulated by varying the ratio in which stimuli are 
presented, has also been found to influence the JTC bias. Dudley et al. (1997a) 
found that participants with delusions performed similarly to controls in that they 
increased the amount of information requested to make a decision when the 
task was harder (i.e., when ratios were 60:40 compared to 85:15). This finding 
is well-replicated (e.g., Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, McKenna & McCarthy, 2006; 
White & Mansell, 2009). Although Dudley et al. (1997a) found that, regardless 
of task difficulty, people with delusions demonstrated JTC, this has not been 
well replicated. Other studies investigating task difficulty have found that the 
JTC bias was only present when the task was more difficult but not when the 
task was easy (e.g., Broome et al, 2007; Menon et al., 2006). However, studies 
that did not manipulate task difficulty have found a JTC bias at the easier ratio 
of 85:15 (e.g., Conway et al., 2002; Garety et al., 1991) suggesting fatigue or 
learning across tasks may influence the findings. Further, So, Freeman and 
Garety (2008) found that the ability to detect a JTC bias was dependent on the 
measurement: JTC was evident, regardless of task difficulty, when measured by 
‘extreme responding’, but only on difficult tasks when draws-to-decision was 
employed.   
 
One aspect of the beads task which has not been explored specifically in the 
JTC literature is the colour of the beads employed. On other cognitive tasks, 
there is evidence that colour affects performance. For example, Elliot, Maier, 
Moller, Friedman and Meinhardt (2007) found that performance was impaired 
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on IQ tests when participants were exposed to the colour red compared to 
those exposed to green, black or white. They argue that red is evolutionarily 
associated with danger and unconsciously evokes an avoidance motivation 
which impedes performance. However, red is also evolutionarily associated with 
attractiveness and therefore may evoke an approach motivation which 
enhances performance (e.g., Mehta & Zhu, 2009). Accordingly, it is likely that 
the colour of beads employed will affect performance on the beads task.   
 
Two studies have investigated the impact of rushing on JTC. White and Mansell 
(2009) found that delusion-prone individuals, who made hastier decisions, were 
in more of a rush to complete the tasks than controls. The magnitude of the JTC 
bias was predicted by how much they were rushing. Keefe and Warman (2011) 
experimentally manipulated the perception of rushing. Although there was no 
effect of rushing on the amount of information requested, delusion-prone 
individuals rated themselves as more certain of their decision despite having the 
same amount of evidence as individuals who were not delusion-prone. Further 
research is needed to better understand how rushing influences JTC. 
 
Cognitive Interventions for the JTC Bias 
Garety et al. (2005) argue that targeting the processes underpinning delusional 
beliefs is fundamental in weakening belief conviction and preventing increased 
distress, and decreased functioning, associated with relapse. Developing this 
metacognitive approach to treatment, Moritz and colleagues devised a group 
treatment programme (see Moritz & Woodward, 2007; Moritz, Vitzthum, 
Randjbar, Veckenstedt & Woodward, 2010). Two modules of their 
Metacognitive Training in Schizophrenia (MCT) focus specifically on JTC. 
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Evaluation of the effectiveness of MCT has shown a non-significant reduction in 
JTC in both people experiencing acute delusions and those in a more stable, 
but chronic phase, of psychosis (Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod & Roesch-
Ely, 2010; Moritz et al., 2010). Briefer interventions have been employed with 
promising results. Ross, Freeman, Dunn and Garety (2011) found that a 45-
minute reasoning training package, partly focussing on data-gathering, was 
successful in increasing the amount of information used to make subsequent 
decisions in individuals currently experiencing delusions. These findings are 
important as they suggest that reasoning biases are amenable to brief, and 
thereby cost-effective, interventions. Further, contrary to MCT, the brief 
intervention did not explicitly link the training to delusional experiences which 
has important implications for the acceptability of the approach in people who 
do not consider their beliefs anomalous.  
 
Goal Intentions, Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement 
Dudley and Over (2003) propose that people with delusions do not have an 
inability to follow formal logical principles (e.g., they are sensitive to changes in 
difficulty on probabilistic tasks). However, difficulties in reasoning arise due to 
their personal goals.  People with delusions assign more threat-related salience 
to neutral stimuli, therefore their personal goal is self-protection. The JTC bias is 
a rapid way of confirming threat-related beliefs thereby initiating self-protective 
behaviour. However, it is the consequence of JTC that lacks rationality because 
incorrect conclusions can be drawn e.g., an innocuous sound on a telephone 
line is perceived as evidence of a government conspiracy. In contrast to the 
desired outcome of self-protection delusional beliefs can actually leave people 
vulnerable to harm and exploitation because their basic needs are neglected. 
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Failure to attain desired outcomes is not unusual. Gollwitzer and Sheeran 
(2006) propose four reasons to account for the discrepancy between intending 
to act and failure to attain the desired outcome: failing to initiate goal striving; 
goal striving becoming ‘derailed’ by undesired influences; failure to disengage 
from goal striving which is ineffective or unproductive, and lacking capacity to 
pursue subsequent goals due to overextension on previous goals. If we are to 
accept Dudley and Over’s (2003) account, it is possible that JTC reflects a 
failure to disengage from a pattern of goal striving that is ineffective. Certainly, it 
is considered particularly ‘difficult to disengage from an ongoing goal pursuit 
when self-defensive concerns are activated’ (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, p. 81) 
as is the case when self-protection is the desired outcome of reasoning for 
people experiencing delusions.   
 
There is evidence that difficulties in the self-regulation of goal pursuit can be 
effectively targeted by forming implementation intentions: ‘if-then’ plans which 
connect specific anticipated situations with goal-directed responses (Gollwitzer, 
1999). Whereas goal intentions focus on the desired end-state (i.e., what is to 
be achieved), implementation intentions define the strategy required to reach 
the goal by identifying environmental cues that initiate predetermined 
behavioural or cognitive responses (the how, where and when of goal 
achievement; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Specifying an association between 
situation and response forms a mental representation that becomes highly 
activated and accessible, transforming conscious, effortful tasks into automatic 
processes controlled by situational cues (Gollwitzer, 1999; Webb & Sheeran, 
2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2008).  
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Implementation intentions are effective for a wide variety of goals: health 
behaviours (e.g., Andersson & Moss, 2011; Sheeran & Orbell, 2000; Armitage, 
2008; 2009), environmental behaviours (e.g., Bamburg, 2000; Holland, Aarts & 
Langendam, 2006) and regulation of emotional and cognitive responses 
(Schweiger Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh & Gollwitzer, 2009; Stewart & 
Payne, 2008). Further, there is evidence for the long-term effectiveness of 
implementation intentions (e.g., Connor & Higgins, 2010; Martin, Sheeran, 
Slade, Wright & Dibble, 2011). 
 
A meta-analysis of the empirical evidence indicated that forming an 
implementation intention had a medium-to-large effect on goal attainment (d+ = 
.65; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). The review provided support for the 
processes underpinning the effectiveness of implementation intentions: the 
activation of the mental representation of specified cues and automatic 
responses to said cues. Implementation intentions had at least a medium effect 
on self-regulatory strategies. In particular, forming an implementation intention 
had a medium effect on preventing disengagement from ineffective goal striving 
(d+ = .47). Accordingly, if JTC was conceptualised as an ineffective approach to 
goal striving, implementation intentions could potentially reduce the bias and 
encourage people with delusions to make more informed decisions.  
 
Although implementation intentions have been successful for individuals who 
experience difficulties persisting with their goals (e.g., adults with schizophrenia 
and children with ADHD; Brandstätter, Legnfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gawrilow 
& Gollwitzer, 2008) and in decision-making (Owens, Bowman & Dill, 2008), 
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studies have yet to determine the effectiveness in reducing the JTC bias 
associated with delusions. 
 
The Present Study 
The present study aims to investigate whether implementation intentions, when 
compared with basic instructions and goal intentions, are effective in reducing 
the JTC bias on neutral and emotionally salient probabilistic reasoning tasks in 
a non-clinical sample with high levels of paranoia. In doing so, the study aims to 
explore whether the bias exists in non-clinical samples and, in particular, in 
people experiencing high levels of paranoia (Freeman et al, 2008; Lincoln et al., 
2011).  Moreover, it examines the impact of the following task manipulations on 
the hastiness of decision-making in a non-clinical sample: type of task (neutral 
vs. emotionally salient); task difficulty (according to variations in ratio); colour of 
the dominant bead (i.e., the colour of the highest proportion of beads in the first 
jar shown: red vs. green) and rushing (by evoking a perceived time pressure).  
 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that:  
(i)  Participants with higher levels of paranoia will demonstrate the JTC bias, 
as determined by significantly fewer draws-to-decision than control 
participants, on neutral and emotionally salient probabilistic reasoning 
tasks.  
(ii)  The JTC bias will decrease as the difficulty of the neutral task increases.  
(iii)  Perceived time pressure will rush participants’ decision-making and 
reduce the amount of information requested to make a decision on the 
neutral task.  
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(iv)  When participants form an implementation intention they will request 
more information to make their decision than participants who form a 
goal intention or receive basic instructions only, on both neutral and 
emotionally salient probabilistic reasoning tasks. 
(v)  Implementation intentions will remain effective even when task 
manipulations exacerbate the JTC bias.  
 
Given the equivocal findings regarding the emotional salience of tasks, no 
specific predictions were made about the difference in draws-to-decision 
between tasks. Although colour impacts on task performance, this has not been 
examined in the JTC literature. Accordingly, no specific predictions were made 
regarding the influence of dominant bead colour on draws-to-decision, although 
we might speculate that decision-making will be more cautious (i.e., more 
information will be requested) where the dominant bead is red (Elliot et al., 
2007).    
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
To determine the sample size required to detect an effect of implementation 
intentions, a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Buchner, 
Erdfelder & Faul, 1997). Based on Gollwitzer and Sheeran’s (2006) meta-
analysis of the implementation intention literature, and using Cohen’s (1988) 
criteria, a medium-to-large effect size of f = .33 was assumed. With a 
significance level of α = .05 and six groups of participants, a total sample of 78 
participants was required to achieve 80% power.  
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An opportunistic self-selecting sample was recruited from the University of 
Sheffield via two routes: the participation in psychological research scheme for 
first-year psychology undergraduates and the university volunteers list 
comprising undergraduate and postgraduate students, and university staff 
across all academic disciplines. Figure 1 presents the flow of participants 
through the study.  
 
Potential participants were contacted by email inviting them to complete an 
Internet-based survey (Appendix C.1). In addition to study information and 
questions pertaining to demographic characteristics, the survey comprised the 
Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Appendix D.1). As the Paranoia 
Scale was developed specifically for non-clinical populations no norms are 
available for clinical samples, though the authors report a mean score of 42.7 
(SD = 10.2) from a possible range of 20 to 100. A large enough distinction in 
paranoia was needed between groups to ensure the best possible chance of 
detecting a JTC bias. Accordingly, high (n = 43) and low (n = 42) paranoia 
groups were determined, respectively by scores within the top and bottom third 
of the range (20-79) of actual scores in the sample. Scores in the high paranoia 
group ranged from 58 to 79 and from 20 to 38 in the low paranoia group. Where 
participants’ scores fell within the mid range they were excluded from the study 
(n = 181). Failure to complete the survey also resulted in exclusion (n = 82). 
Further exclusions were determined by failure to respond to a second email 
invitation to participate in the laboratory-based stage of the study (n = 133), 
providing invalid contact details (n = 11) and not attending/being unable to 
attend the second part of the study (n = 7).   
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Participants in the high and low paranoia groups were randomly allocated to 
one of three instruction groups: control, goal intention and implementation 
intention. On probabilistic reasoning tasks, the control group was provided only 
with the instructions needed to complete the tasks. The goal intention group 
was provided with task instructions in addition to a standardised goal intention 
(‘to do this task well you should take your time before making a decision’). The 
implementation intention group was given task instructions and a standardised 
implementation intention (‘If I am faced with a decision, then I will ask myself - 
have I really gathered enough information to make a good decision?’). Prior to 
the survey task (see Figure 2; Measures below) participants were asked to read 
through the goal intention or the implementation intention from a cue card at 
least three times before the card was removed from sight. Participants were 
asked to repeat the goal or implementation intention to the author to check 
understanding. After completing the survey task, participants were asked to 
repeat the goal or implementation intention again before proceeding with the 
beads task (see Figure 2; Measures below).  
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Information regarding the number of potential participants contacted for participation in the first 
stage is unavailable  
DNA = Did not attend  
CNA = Could not attend  
 
Figure 1. Flow of participants through the study 
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Measures  
Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) 
The Paranoia Scale (Appendix D.1) is a 20-item self-report instrument 
developed specifically to measure paranoia in non-clinical populations. Each 
item relates to at least one of four dimensions of paranoia: (i) belief that 
behaviour or cognitions are influenced by external people or forces; (ii) belief 
that others are against the individual; (iii) belief that others’ talk about or watch 
the individual; (iv) mistrust or suspicion relating to others’ intentions and feeling 
bitterness or resentment. Each item is rated on a five-point scale (1 = not at all 
applicable to me to 5 = extremely applicable to me) resulting in a single total 
item score ranging from 20 to 100. Higher scores indicate greater paranoia. In 
the present sample the Paranoia Scale was deemed reliable (α = .95). This is 
consistent with the original validation which demonstrated internal consistency 
(α = .84), good test-retest reliability (r = .70) and convergent and divergent 
validity (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). The scale has been extensively employed 
to explore paranoia in non-clinical samples (e.g., Newman-Taylor, Graves & 
Stopa, 2009) where the mean score ranges from 39.2 (SD = 12.72; Martin & 
Penn, 2001) to 42.7 (SD = 14.3; Freeman et al., 2005).   
 
Affect-Arousal Scale (Aarts & Dijsterhuis, 2003) 
A modified version of the Affect-Arousal Scale was administered to measure 
mood and level of arousal at the time of testing (Appendix D.2). The measure 
comprises six bipolar items rated on a scale of 1 to 10. Three items measure 
mood: bad-good, sad-happy and pleased-displeased. Three items measure 
arousal: calm-excited, tired-energetic and sedate-aroused. Aarts and Dijsterhuis 
(2003) reported good reliability for the mood scale (α = .81) but moderate 
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reliability for the arousal scale (α = .50). The mood scale was less reliable in the 
present study (α = .50) whereas the arousal scale was slightly more reliable (α 
= .62) but both were below the acceptable level of α = .70 needed to assume 
reliability. 
 
National Adult Reading Test (2nd Edition; Nelson & Willison, 1991)   
The National Adult Reading Test (NART-2; Appendix D.3) uses accuracy in the 
pronunciation of 50 irregularly spelled words (e.g., naive) to measure 
intelligence (IQ). The test is based on the correlation between IQ and reading 
ability. The irregularity of items limits the extent to which participants can guess 
the pronunciation. The test has been standardised on a British sample and 
developed for use alongside the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). 
Strauss, Sherman and Spreen (2006) reported excellent internal consistency (α 
= .90), test-retest reliability (r = .98) and high inter-rater reliability (r = .88). In the 
present study, the test had good internal consistency (α = .77). 
 
Probabilistic Reasoning Tasks 
The Beads Task (Huq et al., 1988; Garety et al., 1991) 
Participants in the present study completed a modified computerised version of 
the beads task presented using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). The ratio of beads was varied to manipulate task difficulty. 
Two sets of five ratios of red and green beads were counter-balanced for 
dominant colour (i.e., the colour of the highest proportion bead in the first jar 
presented): 95:05, 85:15, 75:25, 65:35, 55:45 and presented in two conditions. 
Ratios in the first condition were administered according to the classic paradigm 
(‘no prime’). Music intended to induce a perceived time pressure, and therefore 
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evoke rushing, accompanied each bead drawn in the second (‘prime’) condition. 
The iconic theme tune from the British television game show ‘Countdown’ was 
selected as it is used to time contestants on anagram and maths tasks. It was 
assumed that most participants would recognise the tune and associate it with a 
limited amount of time to complete the task. There was no actual difference 
between the prime and no-prime conditions in the amount of time given to 
complete the task.  
 
In each condition, the predetermined sequence of beads was randomly 
generated and then presented in a fixed order (Appendix E.1). Each ratio of 
beads was presented in a random order within each condition (‘no prime’ and 
‘prime’).  
 
Task instructions and ratios were displayed prior to each change in ratio. On the 
first screen participants were shown a picture of two jars of beads. The jars 
were labelled beneath as either ‘Jar 1’ or ‘Jar 2’ alongside information regarding 
the ratio of coloured beads inside. This information remained on the screen until 
participants responded to the instruction to ‘press the space bar to continue’. 
The following instructions were provided on the subsequent screen: ‘When you 
press the space bar, the computer will pick one of these jars. You will not be 
told which jar the computer has picked. The computer will then pick a bead 
randomly out of this jar. You will be shown this bead and then the computer will 
put it back into the jar. You will then have the option to ask the computer to pick 
more beads out of the jar. Your job is to decide which jar the computer is taking 
the beads out of – Jar 1 or Jar 2. You can ask the computer to show you as 
many or as few beads as you wish. When you think you know which jar the 
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beads are coming from, press the number ‘1’ for Jar 1 and the number ‘2’ for 
Jar 2.’. The participants were instructed to press the space bar again to begin 
each trial. 
 
A pictorial representation of the two jars, but not the numerical ratio, remained 
on the screen throughout each trial. The beads were presented on the screen 
one at a time and remained there until the participant responded. Unlike Dudley 
et al. (1997a) and subsequent studies, a memory aid was not provided in that 
the beads were purportedly replaced in the jar after each draw (i.e., draws were 
random with replacement) rather than remaining in view (random draws). 
Participants were unaware that a maximum of 20 beads could be drawn for 
each ratio, but only 4.7% requested all 20 beads across the conditions. The 
dependent variable was the number of draws-to-decision.  
 
The Survey Task (Dudley, et al. 1997b) 
The survey task is a version of the beads task which employs more emotionally 
salient stimuli. The task was administered by the author not by computer. 
Participants were told that two surveys had been conducted about a person 
‘very much like’ themselves. Both surveys comprised 100 comments where one 
survey was mostly positive (60 positive comments: 40 negative comments) and 
the other survey mostly negative (60 negative comments: 40 positive 
comments). Participants were instructed to ask for as many comments as 
needed to decide which survey the comments were coming from. The 
predetermined sequence of 20 comments was used in previous research 
(Dudley et al, 1997b; Appendix E.2). The dependent variable was the number of 
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draws-to-decision i.e., the number of comments requested before making a 
decision.  
 
Go/No-Go Task (adapted from Bates, Kiehl, Laurens & Liddle, 2009) 
The Go/No-Go paradigm is a measure of inhibitory control. Participants are 
instructed to respond when a ‘go’ stimulus is presented and to withhold their 
response (i.e., do nothing) when a ‘no-go’ stimulus is presented. The go/no-go 
task in the present study acted as a ‘filler’ to minimise learning between the no 
prime and prime conditions of the beads task. However, it also allowed 
exploration of group differences and the influence of executive functioning on 
draws-to-decision. The computerised task was presented using E-Prime 
software (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants were instructed to respond (press 
the space bar) as quickly and as accurately as possible when the letter ‘X’ 
appeared on the screen and do nothing when the letter ‘O’ appeared on the 
screen. Following two practice sequences, two trials were administered. 
Participants were unaware that in the first trial, there was an equal (50:50) 
probability that an X or O would be displayed; in the second trial the probability 
was 75:25, respectively. The letter was displayed on screen for 650 
milliseconds. The duration between each presentation of letter was 1000, 2000 
or 3000 milliseconds.   
 
Effort Rating 
After the tasks finished, participants rated the overall amount of effort they put 
into completing the tasks on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (no effort at all) to 
10 (the most amount of effort possible; Appendix D.4). They were also asked to 
comment on what they thought the study was exploring. Most participants did 
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not make any inferences while others simply repeated the study information 
provided at the outset. The presence of music in the prime condition led many 
participants to infer that the study was exploring the impact of stress, or 
pressure, on task performance. Some participants did identify decision-making 
which is understandable given both the goal intention and implementation 
intention instructions focused specifically on improving the decision-making 
process. No participant made reference to paranoia or JTC. No data were 
excluded from the analysis given no participants inferred the true nature of the 
study. 
 
Procedure 
The study received ethical approval from the University of Sheffield’s 
Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Appendix B.1). 
Participants were told that they were participating in a study investigating the 
relationship between interpersonal beliefs and performance on puzzle tasks 
(Appendix C.2). The true nature of the study was not disclosed in an effort to 
reduce demand effects. All participants were required to give informed consent 
to take part in the study (Appendix C.3). The questionnaires and tasks were 
administered in a fixed order (see Figure 2). All participants were tested 
individually and, with the exception of the computerised tasks, in the presence 
of the author. A proportion of participants from the volunteers list received £5 for 
taking part while the remainder participated voluntarily; first-year psychology 
undergraduates received credits towards course requirements. Participants 
were debriefed verbally and with written information (Appendix C.4). 
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Figure 2. Fixed order procedure 
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Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 16.0 for Windows 
(SPSS, 2007). Participants were not matched on demographic characteristics 
during recruitment. Accordingly, randomisation checks involved comparing both 
the paranoia groups and instruction groups according to demographic 
characteristics. Chi-square tests were employed for group comparisons where 
data were categorical. Where assumptions for parametric data were not met, 
Mann-Whitney and Kruksal-Wallis tests were used to compare groups with two 
or more independent groups respectively. Associations between group 
variables and dependent variables were analysed using Spearman’s rho as the 
data were not parametric. The majority of correlations between group variables 
and the dependent measures were not significant and therefore did not warrant 
inclusion as covariates in the main analysis. Accordingly, for the beads task, a 
mixed 2-between (paranoia: high vs. low) by 3-between (instruction: control vs. 
goal intention vs. implementation intention) by 5-within (ratio: 95:05 vs. 85:15 
vs. 75:25 vs. 65:35 vs. 55:45) by 2-within (dominant bead colour: red vs. green) 
by 2-within (prime: prime vs. no prime) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted. For the survey task, a 2-between (paranoia: high vs. low) by 3-
between (instruction: control vs. goal intention vs. implementation intention) 
ANOVA was conducted. Significant interactions were explored with a series of 
post-hoc ANOVAs. Finally, a mixed 2-between (paranoia: high vs. low) by 3-
between (instruction: control vs. goal intention vs. implementation intention) by 
2-within (beads task vs. survey task) ANOVA compared the neutral and 
emotionally salient tasks. Draws-to-decision was the dependent variable for all 
analyses. 
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RESULTS 
 
Participant Demographics and Randomisation Check 
The demographics of the participants (n = 85) whose data contributed to the 
final analyses are presented in Table 1. Randomisation checks, as outlined 
above, largely revealed no significant differences between both the paranoia 
groups and the instruction groups. To summarise, differences were indicated 
between the paranoia groups only for IQ, affiliation with the Department of 
Psychology and receipt of reimbursement. Further comparisons on other 
measures found differences in mood/arousal but not effort or performance on 
the Go/No-Go task (Table 2). The findings are discussed in more detail below.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Participant Characteristics by Paranoia Group and Instruction Condition 
  Low Paranoia  High Paranoia 
 
 
 Control Goal 
Intention 
Implementation 
Intention 
Total   Control Goal 
Intention 
Implementation 
Intention 
Total 
 
Occupation (n)           
Undergraduate 
student (%) 
 8 
(57.2%) 
 
9 
(64.3%) 
13 
(92.9%) 
30 
(71.4%) 
 13 
(86.7%) 
14 
(100%) 
12 
(85.8%) 
39 
(90.7%) 
Postgraduate  
student (%) 
 1 
(7.1%) 
 
2 
(14.3%) 
0 3 
(7.2%) 
 0 0 1 
(7.1%) 
1 
(2.3%) 
University Staff 
(%) 
 5 
(35.7%) 
3 
(21.4%) 
1 
(7.1%) 
9 
(21.4%) 
 2 
(13.3%) 
0 1 
(7.1%) 
3 
(7.0%) 
Psychology (n)           
Yes (%)  5 
(25%) 
6 
(30%) 
9 
(45%) 
20 
(47.6%) 
 
 14 
(45.2%) 
9 
(29%) 
8 
(25.8%) 
31 
(72.1%) 
No (%)  9 
(40.9%) 
8 
(36.4%) 
5 
(22.7%) 
22 
(52.4%) 
 1 
(8.3%) 
5 
(41.7%) 
6 
(50%) 
12 
(27.9%) 
Reimbursement (n)           
None (%)  5 
(35.7%) 
 
5 
(35.7%) 
4 
(28.6%) 
14 
(33.3%) 
 0 0 
 
1 
(6.7%) 
1 
(2.3%) 
Course credits (%)  4 
(28.6%) 
 
4 
(28.6%) 
7 
(50%) 
15 
(35.7%) 
 9 
(64.3%) 
7 
(50%) 
8 
(53.3%) 
24 
(55.8%) 
Payment (%)  5 
(35.7%) 
5 
(35.7%) 
3 
(21.4%) 
13 
(31.0%) 
 5 
(35.7%) 
7 
(50%) 
6 
(40%) 
18 
(41.9%) 
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Low Paranoia 
 
  
High Paranoia 
 
   
Control 
 
Goal 
Intention 
 
Implementation 
Intention 
 
 
Total  
  
Control 
 
Goal 
Intention 
 
Implementation 
Intention 
 
Total  
 
Mean age  
(SD) 
  
29.07 
(15.26)  
 
26.14 
(11.28) 
 
23.36 
(10.65) 
 
26.19 
(12.48) 
  
21.6 
(8.52) 
 
19.29 
(1.27) 
 
19.86 
(3.16) 
 
20.28 
(5.36) 
 
Gender (n) 
          
Male (%)  3  
(21.4%) 
 
3  
(21.4%) 
5 
(35.7%) 
11 
(26.2%) 
 2 
(13.3%) 
4 
(28.6%) 
5 
(35.7%) 
11 
(25.6%) 
Female (%)  11  
(78.6%) 
 
11  
(78.6%) 
9 
(64.3%) 
31 
(73.8%) 
 13 
(86.7%) 
10 
(71.4%) 
9 
(64.3%) 
32 
(74.4%) 
 
Mean  NART Score 
(SD) 
  
114.79 
(9.09) 
 
116.30 
(8.66) 
 
113.07 
(7.86) 
 
114.74 
(8.45) 
  
107.4 
(6.74) 
 
107.5 
(8.20) 
 
109.21 
(6.70) 
 
108.02 
(7.11) 
 
Mean FPS score 
(SD) 
  
29.57 
(4.35) 
 
 
27.64 
(5.06) 
 
31.71 
(4.16) 
 
29.64 
(4.74) 
  
64.8 
(5.60) 
 
63.43 
(4.90) 
 
64.07 
(2.26) 
 
64.12 
(5.51) 
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Participants’ Age 
The median age of 19 years did not differ between paranoia groups (U = 711.5, 
ns) or instruction group (H = 0.33, ns). Age did not correlate with the dependent 
measure, draws-to-decision, on either the beads task (r = -.19) or the survey 
task (r = -.04); both ns.  
 
Participants’ Gender 
There were no significant differences in gender between the paranoia groups 
(χ2 (1) = .00, ns) or instruction groups (χ2 (2) = 2.56, ns). There was no 
correlation between gender and draws-to-decision on either the beads task (r = 
-.04) or the survey task (r = -.07); both ns.  
 
NART Scores 
Differences between the paranoia groups existed in NART scores 
demonstrating that the low paranoia group had significantly higher IQ (Mdn = 
116.50) than the high paranoia group (Mdn = 108.00; U = 471.00, p < .001). 
There was no significant difference in NART scores between the instruction 
groups (H = 0.15, ns). NART scores (IQ) did not correlate with the dependent 
measures on the beads task (r = -.18, ns) but did on the survey task (r = .22, p 
< .05). Further analysis of the latter relationship, revealed that higher IQ was 
associated with more draws-to-decision on the survey task in the high paranoia 
group (r = 0.35, p < .01), but not the low paranoia group (r = .28, ns). Similarly, 
higher IQ was related to increased information requested on the survey task for 
the goal intention group (r = .56, p < .001) but not the control (r = .04, ns) or 
implementation intention (r = -.06, ns) groups.    
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Occupational Background 
Participants were categorised as either undergraduate students, postgraduate 
students or university staff. However, there was no difference between paranoia 
groups (χ2 (2) = 5.16, ns) or instruction groups (χ2 (4) = 4.29, ns) in occupational 
background. However, the assumption of a minimum number of variables in this 
analysis was violated reducing confidence in these findings. Occupational 
background was not correlated with draws-to-decision on either the beads task 
(r = -.09) or the survey task (r = -.12); both ns. 
 
Did participants have a psychology background? 
Of those participants who worked or studied in the Department of Psychology 
significantly more were in the high paranoia group (60.8%) than the low 
paranoia group (29.2%; χ2 (1) = 5.303, p < .05). Participants in the instruction 
groups did not differ according to whether they came from a psychology 
background (χ2 (2) = .86, ns). Psychology background was not correlated with 
draws-to-decision for either the beads task (r = .01) or the survey task (r = -.04); 
both ns. 
 
Were participants reimbursed? 
More participants in the low paranoia group did not receive reimbursement 
(33.3%) than the high paranoia group (2.3%), while more participants in the 
high paranoia group received credits (55.8%) or payment (41.8%) than the low 
paranoia group (35.7% and 31% respectively; χ2 (2) = 14.14, p < .001). 
Participants in the instructions groups did not differ according to whether they 
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received reimbursement for participating (χ2 (4) = .90, ns). There was no 
correlation between reimbursement and the dependent measure on either the 
beads task (r = .07) or the survey task (r = -.06); both ns. 
 
Mood/Arousal 
The paranoia groups significantly differed in mood valence. Participants in the 
high paranoia group rated themselves lower on the ‘Bad-Good’ continuum (Mdn 
= 7) compared to the low paranoia group (Mdn = 8; U = 646.5, p < .05). The 
high paranoia group also demonstrated significantly less positive mood (Mdn = 
7) than the low paranoia group (Mdn = 8) on the ‘Sad-Happy’ continuum (U = 
668.5, p < .05). There were no differences between the paranoia groups on the 
other measure of mood (Pleased-Displeased, U = 891.00) or any of the 
measures of arousal (Calm-Excited, U = 842.50, Tired-Energetic, U = 740.50 
and Sedate-Aroused, U = 791.50; all ns). There were no differences between 
the instruction groups on any of the mood measures (Bad-Good, H = .06; Sad-
Happy, H = .30; Pleased-Displeased, H = 3.01; all ns) or the arousal measures 
(Calm-Excited, H = .05; Sedate-Aroused, H = .30; Tired-Energetic, H = .04; all 
ns). There were no significant correlations between scores on the mood/arousal 
measures and draws-to-decision on the beads task (Bad-Good, r = .17; Sad-
Happy, r = .04; Pleased-Displeased, r = .10; Calm-Excited, r = -.07; Sedate-
Aroused, r = .15; Tired-Energetic, r = .03; all ns) or the survey task (Bad-Good, r 
= .08; Sad-Happy, r = .01; Pleased-Displeased, r = -.01; Calm-Excited, r = -.08; 
Sedate-Aroused, r = .12; Tired-Energetic, r = -.08; all ns). 
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Task Effort 
There were no significant differences in the amount of effort participants put into 
the tasks between both the paranoia groups (U = 732.00, ns) and the instruction 
groups (H = .47, ns). Effort did not correlate with draws-to-decision on the 
beads task (r = -.08, ns) or the survey task (r = .10, ns). 
 
Go/No-Go Task   
On the Go/No-Go task, participants in the high and low paranoia groups did not 
differ in response inhibition as measured by the number of correct positive 
responses (U = 733.50, ns) and false positive responses (U = 892.00, ns). 
Similarly, response inhibition did not differ between the instruction groups 
(correct positives: H = 3.70; false positives: H = .81; both ns). On the beads task 
both correct positive responses (r = -.03, ns) and false positive responses (r = -
.10, ns) did not correlate with draws-to-decision. This was consistent with the 
survey task where no correlations were found between correct positive 
responses (r = -.15, ns) or false positive responses (r = .02) and the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 2 
Summary of significant differences between paranoia groups 
  
High 
 
 
Low 
 
Statistic 
 
IQ (Mdn) 
 
 
108.0 
 
116.5 
 
U = 471.00* 
Psychology (%) 
 
60.8% 29.2% χ2 (1) = 5.303** 
Reimbursement (%)    
None 2.3% 
 
33.3%  
 
χ2 (2) = 14.14* Credits 55.8% 
 
35.7% 
Payment 41.8% 
 
31% 
Mood/Arousal (Mdn)    
Bad-Good 7 
 
8 U = 646.5*** 
Sad-Happy 7 
 
8 U = 668.5** 
* p < .001; ** p < .05; *** p < .01;  
 
Main Analysis 
 
Hypothesis i: Participants with higher levels of paranoia will demonstrate the 
JTC bias 
Table 3 presents the mean draws-to-decision for the paranoia groups and 
instruction groups averaged across all manipulations of the beads task. On the 
beads task, the data suggest that there was little difference between high and 
low paranoia groups on the amount of information requested. This was 
supported by the mixed ANOVA which indicated no main effect of paranoia, 
F(1, 79) = .01, ns, η2 = .00. 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATING THE JTC BIAS: IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS 
 
[77] 
 
Table 3 
Mean (SD) draws-to-decision on beads task 
    
Paranoia Group 
 
 
Instruction Group 
 
  
High 
 
Low 
  
Total 
 
Control 
 
 
 
5.78 (2.50) 
 
5.82 (3.74) 
 
 
5.80 (3.10) 
Goal Intention 
 
 
6.40 (3.11) 7.05 (3.26) 
 
6.73 (3.14) 
Implementation 
Intention 
 
7.92 (3.47) 7.48 (3.46) 
 
7.70 (3.41) 
 
Total 
 
  
6.68 (3.10) 
 
6.78 (3.45) 
  
 
The mean numbers of draws-to-decision for the paranoia groups and the 
instruction groups on the survey task are shown in Table 4. The two-way 
ANOVA revealed that the main effect of paranoia group, F(1, 79) = 1.17, ns, η2 
= .00, was non-significant. Taken together with the findings from the beads task 
this suggests that JTC was not present in the current sample.  
 
Table 4 
Mean (SD) draws-to-decision for the survey task 
  
 
  
Paranoia Group 
 
 
Instruction Group 
 
  
High 
 
Low 
  
Total 
 
Control 
 
  
8.33 (5.51) 
 
5.92 (5.85) 
 
 
 
7.17 (5.71) 
Goal Intention 
 
 
7.86 (6.70) 11.71 (6.41) 
 
9.79 (6.73) 
Implementation 
Intention 
 
12.21 (7.21) 6.57 (3.23) 
 
9.39 (6.19) 
 
Total 
  
9.44 (6.63) 
 
 
8.07 (5.84) 
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Hypothesis ii: JTC will decrease as the difficulty of the neutral task increases 
The absence of a main effect of paranoia suggests that the JTC bias was not 
present in the current sample. However, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
ratio, F(4, 316) = 72.01, p < .001, η2 = .48, indicating that all groups requested 
more information as the difficulty of the task increased with the variations in 
ratio: 95:05 (M = 4.34; SD = 2.13); 85:15 (M = 5.28; SD = 3.53); 75:25 (M = 
7.07; SD = 3.95); 65:35 (M = 7.05; SD = 3.81); 55:45 (M = 9.91; SD = 5.28). 
 
Hypothesis iii: Perceived time pressure will rush participants into requesting less 
information 
On the neutral beads task, the main effect of prime was not significant, F(1, 79) 
= .40, ns, η2 = .01, indicating that rushing had no impact the number of draws-
to-decision (M = 6.67, SD = 3.40) compared to not rushing (M = 6.79, SD = 
3.39).  
 
Hypothesis iv: More information will be requested by participants who form an 
implementation intention 
On the beads tasks, the main effect of instruction group was non-significant, 
F(2, 79) = 2.40, ns, η2 = .06, (see Table 3). Similarly, on the survey task, there 
were no differences between participants based on the instructions that they 
received prior to completing the task, F(2, 79) = 1.66, ns, η2 = .00. Taken 
together these findings suggest that implementation intentions were not more 
effective than goal intentions or basic instructions in increasing the amount of 
information requested 
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Colour of the dominant bead 
No specific predictions were made regarding the influence of the dominant bead 
colour on the amount of information requested. However, there was a significant 
main effect of dominant colour, F(1, 79) = 38.51, p < .001, η2 = .33, suggesting 
that more information was requested when the highest proportion of beads in 
Jar 1 was red (M = 7.08, SD = 3.42) than when the highest proportion was 
green (M = 6.38, SD = 3.21).   
 
Interactions between Variables 
Hypothesis v: Implementation intentions will remain effective where task 
manipulations exacerbate the JTC bias 
Although the JTC bias was not present in the current sample and 
implementation intentions did not appear to impact on the amount of information 
requested on both the beads task and the survey task, the main analysis 
revealed a number of interactions between variables.  
 
Beads Task  
The main effects on the beads task were qualified by a significant three-way 
interaction between ratio, dominant colour and instruction group, F(8, 316) = 
2.08, p < .05, η2 = .05. A series of additional ANOVAs were conducted to further 
explore this interaction. Separate repeated measures ANOVAs comparing ratio 
by dominant colour and instruction group revealed that, regardless of whether 
the dominant colour was red or green, there was a significant effect of ratio for 
all instruction groups at the p < .001 level (see Figure 3). The size of the effect 
of ratio was larger when the dominant colour was red (control: F(4, 112) = 
20.17, η2 = .42; goal intention: F(4, 108) = 28.79, η2 = .52; implementation 
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intention: F(4, 108) = 37.70, η2 = .58) compared to when the dominant colour 
was green  (control: F(4, 112) = 9.11, η2 = .25; goal intention: F(4, 108) = 8.37, 
η2 = .24; implementation intention: F(4, 108) = 25.45, η2 = .49). Overall, the 
more difficult the task became the more information participants requested. Post 
hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that the difference in draws-to-decision between 
ratios was significant for the majority of comparisons at the minimum p < .05 
level.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean draws-to-decision across ratio by group and dominant colour 
 
To explore the differences between dominant colour by instruction group, initial 
repeated measures ANOVAs indicated a main effect of colour in the control 
(F(1, 28) = 4.54, p < .05, η2 = .14), goal intention (F(1, 27) = 13.85, p < .001, η2 
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= .34) and the implementation intention (F(1, 27) = 25.35, p < .001, η2 = .48) 
groups. These initial findings suggest that within each instruction group, 
participants requested more information when the dominant colour was red 
compared to when the dominant colour was green. Further repeated measures 
ANOVAs comparing dominant colour by instruction group and ratio revealed 
that the main effect of colour held true for the majority of ratios across the 
instruction groups at the minimum of p < .05 level. However, what becomes 
more apparent through this subsequent analysis is that the direction of the 
effect changes as the ratios decrease. In Figure 4 the mean draws-to-decision 
for each ratio by dominant colour have been averaged across the instruction 
groups to demonstrate the interaction between dominant colour and ratio. 
Where the task is easier (i.e., where the ratios are more distinguishable) 
participants requested more information when the dominant bead in the ratio is 
green. However, when the task becomes more difficult, more information is 
requested when the dominant bead is red. Specifically, this change occurs 
when the ratio moves from 85:15 to 75:25. 
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Figure 4. Mean draws-to-decision across ratio by colour  
 
However, this trend must be viewed with caution given that there was no 
significant difference in draws-to-decision according to dominant colour for 
ratios 55:45 in the implementation intention group (F(1, 27) = 1.63, ns,  η2 = 
.06), 75:25 in the control (F(1, 28) = .48, ns, η2 = .02) and the goal intention 
(F(1, 27) = 2.57, ns,  η2 = .09), 85:15 in the goal intention group only (F(1, 27) = 
1.01, ns,  η2 = .04) and 95:05 in the implementation intention group only (F(1, 
27) = 2.81, ns,  η2 = .09).     
 
Finally, one-way ANOVAs were carried out to explore the differences between 
instruction groups for each dominant colour and ratio. Where the dominant 
colour was red, there was no main effect of instruction group for the ratios 95:05 
(F(2, 82) = 2.59, ns, η2 = .06), 85:15 (F(2, 82) = .16, ns, η2 = .00) or 55.45 (F(2, 
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82) = 2.16, ns, η2 = .05). Bonferroni post hoc tests for the main effect of 
instruction group for the 75:25 ratio, F(2, 82) = 3.80, p < .05, η2 = .09, and 65:35 
ratio, F(2, 82) = 4.30, p < .05, η2 = .10,  signified that participants who received 
an implementation intention requested significantly more information than those 
who received basic instructions in the control group (both p <.05). Where the 
dominant colour was green, there was no main effect of instruction group for 
majority of the ratios: 95:05 (F(2, 82) = 1.39, ns, η2 = .03), 85:15 (F(2, 82) = .33, 
p = ns, η2 = .01), 75:25 (F(2, 82) = .68, ns, η2 = .02). The effect of the 65:35 
ratio reached trend level, but was not significant (F(2, 82) = 2.45, ns, η2 = .06). 
Consistent with the previous findings, post hoc Bonferroni tests for the main 
effect of instruction group where the ratio was 55:45 (F(2,82) = 3.61, p < .05, η2  
= .08) indicated that significantly more information was requested by the 
implementation intention group compared to the control group (p < .05).   
 
Survey task 
Although there were no main effects for either paranoia or instruction group on 
the survey task, there was a significant interaction between the two variables on 
the number of draws-to-decision: F(2, 79) = 4.61, p < .01, η2 = .10. Simple main 
effects revealed no significant differences between the instruction groups for the 
high paranoia group. However, a main effect of instruction group was found for 
the low paranoia group: F(2, 39) = 4.92, p < .05, η2 = .20. Consistent with visual 
inspection of the data, post hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that participants who 
received the goal intention instructions requested significantly more information 
than either those who received the implementation intention (p < .05) and those 
who were given basic instructions only in the control group (p < .02). Contrary to 
expectation, there was no significant difference in the amount of information 
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requested between the control group and the implementation intention group. 
Further, although there was no main effect of paranoia for either the control or 
goal intention groups, there was for the implementation intention group, F(1, 26) 
= 7.14, p < .01, η2 = .22, where high paranoia participants requested more 
information (M = 12.21, SD = 7.21) than the low paranoia participants (M = 
6.57, SD = 3.23).  
 
Task Comparison 
No specific predictions were made regarding the impact of varying the 
emotional saliency of the tasks. The mixed ANOVA comparing the beads task 
against the survey task by paranoia group and instruction group revealed a 
main effect of task, F(1,79) = 8.39, p < .001, η2 = .10, where more information 
was requested on the survey task (M  = 8.76, SD = 6.25) compared to the 
beads task (M = 6.73, SD = 3.27). The main effect was qualified by a significant 
three way interaction between task, paranoia group and instruction group 
(F(2,79) = 3.09, p < .05, η2 = .07). Further exploration of this interaction 
indicated that the type of task had no impact on the amount of information 
requested in the low paranoia group (F(1,41) = 1.62, ns, η2 = .04). However, 
participants in the high paranoia group requested more information on the 
survey task (M = 9.44, SD = 6.63) than the beads task (M = 6.68, SD = 3.10 
F(1,41) = 7.57, p < .001, η2 = .15). Further, there was no main effect of type of 
task for the control group (F(1,28) = 1.86, ns, η2 = .06) or the implementation 
intention group (F(1,27) = 1.80, ns, η2 = .06). However there was a main effect 
of task in the goal intention group (F(1,27) = 4.52, p <.05, η2 = .14) where 
participants also requested more information on the survey task (M = 9.78, SD 
= 6.73) than the beads task (M = 6.73, SD = 3.14). 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The present study aimed to contribute to growing evidence that the JTC bias 
robustly found in people experiencing delusions, exists in non-clinical samples 
and specifically in people who experience non-clinical paranoid or persecutory 
beliefs. Contrary to expectation, the number of draws-to-decision did not 
differentiate the high and low paranoia groups on either the neutral or 
emotionally salient probabilistic reasoning tasks. The finding is inconsistent with 
previous research specifically focusing on the relationship between paranoia 
and JTC in non-clinical samples (Freeman et al. 2008; Lincoln et al, 2010; 
2011). However, it does reflect inconsistencies in the ability to detect the 
reasoning bias in relation to generic delusion-proneness (e.g., Colbert & Peters, 
2002; Ziegler et al., 2008; Warman & Martin, 2006).  
 
The absence of JTC has implications for our understanding of how the bias 
relates to delusions. The presence of JTC in non-clinical participants has been 
used as evidence that hasty decision-making is a trait of people on the 
delusional continuum and therefore implicated in the formation of delusions 
(e.g., Colbert & Peters, 2002). However, the present findings do not support this 
assertion.  
 
Freeman et al. (2008) concluded that the data-gathering bias in the general 
population is less prevalent and more subtle than in clinical samples so the 
current finding is perhaps unsurprising. Further, the evidence that JTC is related 
specifically to persecutory delusions is assumed by the literature given that the 
majority of delusions are persecutory in nature (Freeman, 2007). However, this 
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has not been systematically investigated, therefore the association between 
JTC and clinical persecutory beliefs is not conclusive. Moreover, task 
manipulations did have a significant impact on performance in the present study 
potentially masking any inherent differences between the paranoia groups. This 
latter point is consistent with the difficulties encountered in detecting JTC in 
delusion-prone samples. For example, studies have failed to detect a JTC bias 
on the beads task but have on emotionally salient or more realistic tasks (e.g., 
Ziegler, et al., 2008; Warman & Martin, 2006). 
   
Contrary to expectation, participants did not rush their decision-making when 
the task was accompanied with music intended to induce rushing. The failure to 
find a difference between paranoia groups is consistent with Keefe and Warman 
(2011) who found that the amount of information requested did not differ as a 
result of attempts to rush. However, the findings differ from White and Mansell 
(2009), who found that rushing to complete the task was related to delusion-
proneness. It is possible that differences in the measures employed can 
account for the discrepancy with White and Mansell (2009). They employed a 
self-report measure of rushing, whereas the present study attempted to induce 
rushing experimentally. It is, however, also possible that the attempt to evoke 
rushing in this study was not effective. It was assumed that music from 
‘Countdown’ was sufficiently iconic to be associated with a time pressure. 
Anecdotally participants certainly expressed feeling pressured. Nonetheless, it 
could be argued that some participants may never have watched the game 
show and therefore would not associate the music with a time pressure.       
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To the best of the author’s knowledge this was the first study to consider how 
the colour of the beads employed affected the amount of information reviewed 
when making a decision. No directional predictions were made regarding the 
impact on draws-to-decision given that previous research exploring the 
association between colour and task performance is equivocal (Mehta & Zhu, 
2009). However, the findings indicated that participants requested more beads 
when the highest proportion of beads in Jar 1 was red. The findings are 
consistent with the assertion that the colour red is associated with caution. 
Further, it appears that red is related to an avoidance motivation which appears 
to hinder performance (Elliot et al., 2007; Mehta & Zhu, 2009).   
 
As hypothesised, task difficulty, as determined by varying the ratio in which the 
beads were presented, had an effect on decision-making. All participants 
responded to increases in task difficulty by increasing the amount of information 
requested before making a decision. The failure to find a difference between 
paranoia groups is consistent with previous studies employing clinical samples 
(e.g. Menon et al., 2006) but not studies employing non-clinical samples at risk 
from developing delusions (e.g. Broome et al., 2007). It could be argued that the 
present finding supports the view that people with higher levels of paranoia do 
reason similarly to those with lower levels of paranoia (Garety & Freeman, 
1999; Maher, 1992). 
 
The colour of the dominant bead interacted with task difficulty although it is 
unclear why. The findings suggest that when the task was easier the colour red 
motivated an approach response as indicated by fewer draws-to-decision. 
However, when the task was more difficult red motivated avoidance and 
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signalled caution as indicated by more draws-to-decision (Elliot et al., 2007; 
Mehta & Zhu, 2009). One explanation for this shift is that colour only impacts on 
task performance when cognitive demands are high, that is, when the task 
difficulty is greater. Clearly, the impact of the colour of the beads employed has 
considerable implications for the JTC literature given that it has not been 
previously investigated as a mediating variable in the bias. It is possible that the 
choice of coloured beads will impact on the JTC bias, although the present 
finding needs replicating in samples where there is a clear JTC bias before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. Further, it is likely that the effect of colour on 
decision-making is more prominent where colours with more apparent 
connotations are employed (e.g., red).   
 
This was also the first study to investigate the effectiveness of implementation 
intentions in reducing the JTC bias. Although the data-gathering bias was not 
detected in the current sample, implementation intentions did influence 
performance on the tasks. It was predicted that forming an implementation 
intention would lead to more cautious decision-making, therefore, the absence 
of a main effect of instruction on either probabilistic task was surprising. 
Although it just failed to reach significance, the trend of data on the beads task 
was, however, consistent with expectations. Where participants formed an 
implementation intention they requested more information before making a 
decision than those who received no instructions or simply formed a goal 
intention. Previous attempts to demonstrate the effectiveness of interventions 
aimed at increasing the amount of information requested on probabilistic 
reasoning tasks have had similar results. For instance evaluations of 
Metacognitive Training (MCT) have demonstrated similar non-significant trends 
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(e.g., Aghotor et al., 2010; Moritz et al. 2011). Further, others have been unable 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) on JTC 
(Garety et al. 2008).    
 
Alternatively, it is also possible that the interaction between instructions, ratio 
and dominant colour accounts for the failure to find a main effect of instruction 
on the beads tasks. Implementation intentions were effective in increasing the 
amount of information requested, compared with the formation of a goal 
intention or no instruction, in certain conditions. However, it is unclear why 
implementation intentions were only effective when the dominant bead was red 
and the ratio 75:25 or 65:35 or when the dominant bead was green and the ratio 
55.45. The limited effectiveness of implementation intentions in altering routine 
decision-making has been demonstrated elsewhere (Betsch, Haberstroh, Molter 
& Glöckner, 2004). However, other studies have shown that implementation 
intentions are effective in facilitating performance on executive functioning tasks 
where response biases exist (e.g., Cohen, Bayer, Jaudas & Gollwitzer, 2008; 
Miles & Proctor, 2008).  
 
It is possible that task difficulty can offer an explanation, given that the formation 
of an implementation intention was not effective when the ratio was 95:05 or 
85:15 for either dominant colour. Ross et al. (2011) found that their intervention 
to address the JTC bias was also less effective on easier tasks. They propose 
that to withhold a decision where the correct answer is apparent (e.g., when the 
ratio is 85:15 or 95:05) is not advantageous as it improbable that accuracy will 
improve. The implementation intention instructed participants to gather ‘enough 
information to make a good decision’. On easier tasks, it might not be expected 
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that more draws-to-decisions would lead to any better a decision than fewer 
draws-to-decision. Accordingly, it is understandable that the amount of 
information requested by participants who formed the implementation intention 
would not differ from those who received no instructions or simply formed a goal 
intention.     
 
Further, there is also evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of 
implementation intentions is also sensitive to variations in task difficulty 
(Sheeran, Webb & Gollwitzer, 2006). When the intended goal is easy to achieve 
(i.e., there are few obstacles) self-efficacy and strong goal intentions are 
sufficient factors to promote goal achievement, leaving implementation 
intentions redundant. However, when the task is more difficult, the formation of 
implementation intentions overcomes potential obstacles (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006). In the present study, participants appear able to achieve the goal of 
making a decision without the support of implementation intentions when the 
task is easy (e.g., a ratio of 95:05). However, when the difficulty increases (e.g., 
a ratio of 55:45) participants benefit from forming an implementation intention.    
 
That there was no difference between paranoia groups on the more emotionally 
salient survey task is perhaps not surprising given that it proved difficult to 
detect a JTC bias in the current sample. Further, evidence of the impact of 
emotional saliency is equivocal (e.g., Dudley et al., 1997b; Warman, 2008; 
Warman & Martin, 2006; Young & Bentall, 1997). The role of instructions on the 
survey task was surprising. In the low paranoia group, simply having a goal 
intention resulted in more information being requested than when participants 
formed an implementation intention. Further, the formation of an implementation 
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intention did not result in more cautious reasoning when compared to task 
instructions only. It is possible that intelligence might explain this finding given 
that scores on the NART were positively correlated with draws-to-decision on 
the survey task in the goal intention group.  
 
However, motivational factors might also contribute to the absence of behaviour 
change in response to the formation of an implementation intention. 
Increasingly, the importance of concordance between goal intention and 
implementation intention is recognised as moderating the effect on behaviour 
(e.g., Sheeran, Webb & Gollwitzer, 2005). Implementation intentions are less 
likely to be effective when the individual’s underlying goal intention is not 
concordant with the specified behaviour. Further, the strength of goal intention 
is important. Implementation intentions need to be supported by strong goal 
intentions. It could be argued that participants in the present study were unlikely 
to be invested in performing well on the tasks. Consequently, the strength of 
their goal intention may have been weak thereby affecting the how beneficial 
the implementation intention was.  
 
Consistent with this notion, participants in the high paranoia group appeared 
more receptive to forming an implementation intention than those in the low 
paranoia group on the survey task. It could be argued that participants with 
higher levels of paranoia are more likely to feel judged or criticised if they 
perform badly. Accordingly, the strength of their goal intention to do the task 
well might have been higher, and therefore more concordant with the 
implementation intention, than participants with lower levels of paranoia. There 
is also evidence to suggest that people who experience difficulties pursuing 
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their goals (e.g., people with schizophrenia; Brandstätter, Legnfelder & 
Gollwitzer, 2001) are more likely to benefit from forming an implementation 
intention than those who do not experience difficulties in goal striving (Sheeran, 
Webb & Gollwitzer, 2006). It is therefore possible that participants in the high 
paranoia group encountered more difficulties in goal striving (e.g., becoming 
derailed) and so benefitted more from the formation of implementation 
intentions. However, these inferences are made with caution given that there is 
no consistent pattern in the effects of implementation intentions across tasks. 
 
Although the paranoia groups did not differ on the survey task, varying the 
emotional content did have an impact on reasoning between tasks. However, 
the findings contrast with the assumption that emotional salience will 
exacerbate JTC across all participants because decision-making was less hasty 
when the content was emotionally salient (Dudley et al., 1997b). This finding 
was specific to the high paranoia group thereby potentially undermining 
theoretical accounts which emphasise the role of affect in JTC (e.g., Dudley & 
Over, 2003). However, caution is needed in interpreting this finding because it 
could reflect the effectiveness of implementation intentions in increasing the 
amount of information requested on the survey task. 
 
It is also possible that the ratio in which stimuli was presented can account for 
the findings. The mean draws-to-decision across ratios on the beads task was 
employed for task comparison which, therefore, comprised hastier decision-
making when the task was easy and conservative decision-making when the 
task was more difficult. A more valid comparison might have been to match the 
60:40 ratio of the survey task to the nearest ratio on the beads task (i.e., 65:35).    
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Limitations of the Study 
It is possible that limitations inherent within the study can account for the failure 
to detect a data-gathering bias in the present sample. The power of the study 
was determined by literature pertaining to the effectiveness of implementation 
intentions. Consequently, the study may have been underpowered to be able to 
detect the data-gathering bias, increasing the probability that a true JTC effect 
has been missed in the present sample.   
 
Further, the relationship between JTC and paranoia in non-clinical samples 
lacks clarity. Although, Lincoln et al. (2011) found an association between non-
clinical paranoia and JTC, Freeman et al. (2008) suggested that the presence of 
persecutory beliefs alone is insufficient; rather it is the conviction with which 
such beliefs are held that is related to the data-gathering bias. It is possible that 
the differences between previous study findings reflect the definition of JTC 
employed (draws-to-decision vs. extreme responding). Nevertheless, had the 
present study employed a measure of conviction it may have been possible to 
detect a JTC bias in the present study. However, the complexity of the study 
design and the partial effects of the intervention cloud any inferences which can 
be drawn from inability to detect a JTC bias.  
 
The complexity of the study design reflects those variables identified in the 
literature as having an impact on the JTC bias, in addition to variables which 
had yet to be explored. This is important if we are to further our understanding 
of JTC and whether interventions can successfully address the bias. However, 
the complexity of the present study, and the interactions between variables, 
limits the extent to which theoretical and clinical implications can be drawn. For 
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example, the duration and repetitiveness of the beads task may have led to 
increased fatigue and boredom which likely impacts on participants’ effort and 
concentration.  
 
More fundamental to the present study is that the large number of variables, in 
addition to the likelihood that the study was underpowered to explore both JTC 
and the effectiveness of implementation intentions, meant that there were small 
numbers of participants in each comparison group. Consequently, the analysis 
of main effects and interactions between variables was compromised due to the 
increased the likelihood that a type II error has been made (i.e. incorrectly 
accepting the null hypotheses that there was no difference between groups). 
Accordingly, caution is required when interpreting the findings; it is possible that 
the failure to detect a JTC bias was a consequence of a type II error rather than 
evidence that the bias does not exist in non-clinical samples. Similarly, the trend 
in the data indicating the effectiveness of implementation intentions may have 
reached statistical significance had the study design been less complex and 
sufficiently powered.  
 
To determine whether a JTC bias was present in the current sample, the study 
design would have benefitted from having a baseline measure by examining 
reasoning pre and post intervention. However, this introduces the potential for 
practice effects which are known to increase the amount of information 
requested as the tasks progress (e.g., Warman & Martin, 2006).      
 
Randomisation checks revealed that participants in the high and low paranoia 
groups differed in IQ, affiliation with the Department of Psychology, the receipt 
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of reimbursement and mood/arousal. The study would have benefitted from 
matching samples from the outset to reduce the possibility that variations 
between groups influenced the findings.  
 
Findings relating to the relationship between intelligence and the JTC bias are 
equivocal within the literature. Some studies have found that the bias is 
associated with lower IQ (e.g., Freeman et al, 2008; Garety et al, 1991) 
whereas others suggest that the bias is unrelated to intelligence (e.g. Broome et 
al, 2007; Mortimer et al, 1996). Although participants in the low paranoia group 
in the present sample had significantly higher IQ than those in the high paranoia 
group, it is unsurprising that intelligence across both groups was higher than 
average given the sample was recruited from a university population. It could be 
argued that higher intelligence protects against the JTC bias because it is 
associated with improved reasoning.  
 
Although IQ was correlated with the dependent measure on the survey task, 
this was only true for the high paranoia group and the goal intention group. 
Given these findings, and the existing complexity of the analysis, IQ was not 
included as a covariate. However, if higher intelligence does protect against 
JTC, IQ may offer a further explanation for the failure to detect a JTC bias in the 
present study. Further, IQ may have contributed to the unexpected finding that 
participants who formed a goal intention on the survey task requested more 
information than those who formed an implementation intention. Accordingly, 
the study would have benefitted from including IQ as a covariate in the analysis 
to clarify this finding.  
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Certainly the relationship between intelligence and the JTC bias requires further 
consideration in future research, particularly in clinical samples. Given that 
higher levels of non-clinical paranoia were found in the present sample in the 
absence of a JTC bias, the study raises a significant question as to whether 
JTC is associated with paranoia when intelligence is higher. Should intelligence 
protect against the JTC bias but not the development of paranoia or persecutory 
beliefs, there are important implications for our understanding of the role of JTC 
in the formation of delusions.     
 
Although the tasks employed in the present study were consistent with the 
original paradigm used to explore JTC and thereby allow comparison with 
previous research, they lacked ecological validity. Accordingly, the task may 
have influenced the amount of investment participants had in the study. 
Although effort ratings were generally high, and did not differ between paranoia 
or instruction groups, the self-report measurement may have lacked validity and 
be vulnerable to biases. Therefore, it is possible that participants put less effort 
into completing the tasks than reported. Further, it is unclear what impact the 
ecological validity of the task has on the JTC bias. Certainly, the survey task 
was developed, in part, to address this issue. However, the assumption that 
increasing the social/emotional saliency of the task would exacerbate JTC has 
received equivocal support (see Fine et al, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
However, attempts to increase the personal saliency of the survey task by 
having participants generate a list of positive and negative words that describe 
themselves has impacted on the bias, albeit only in the confidence with which a 
decision is made (Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis & Haudenschield, 2007). 
Further attempts to increase the ecological validity, and comprehensibility, of 
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the task while retaining the underlying probabilistic principles (e.g., making 
judgements about the plausibility of competing titles to describe classical 
paintings) have successfully demonstrated the JTC bias (Moritz et al, 2009; 
Woodward, Munz, LeClerc & Lecomte, 2009). However, the findings have not 
been compared with findings from the original beads task paradigm, therefore 
the impact on JTC remains unclear.   
 
In addition to the difficulties associated with the ecological validity of the beads 
task, the presentation of the beads may have introduced bias into the findings. 
Although the predetermined sequences of beads were presented in a random 
order, the sequence themselves were randomly generated but then fixed 
(Appendix E.1). In some sequences (e.g., Red 95: Green 05 in the no prime 
condition) the first bead could be perceived as misleading (i.e., a green bead 
was presented when a red would be expected given the ratio). Given the 
importance of colour on task performance, and the potential impact an 
incongruent first bead may have, further analysis of the impact of sequencing 
on the amount of information requested is needed. Certainly, previous studies 
have employed both fixed order and counterbalanced sequences and found that 
the presentation order affects the JTC bias (e.g., Moritz & Woodward, 2005; 
Dudley et al. 1997a). Furthermore, Warman and Martin (2006) found the JTC 
bias was present on emotionally salient tasks only when the first stimulus was 
weighted negatively.  
 
The limited effectiveness of the implementation intentions may reflect the 
design of the implementation intention itself. To be effective the specified cue to 
respond (the ‘if’ of the implementation intention) needs to be accessible (Webb 
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& Sheeran, 2007; 2008). The cue in the present implementation intention may 
have benefitted from increased specificity (e.g., rather than ‘if I am faced with a 
decision’ a more specific cue could be ‘if I am asked to make a decision about 
which jar a bead has come from’. Further, the behavioural response might have 
been better matched to the task (e.g., rather than ‘then I will ask myself - have I 
really gathered enough information?’ a more specific response could be ‘then I 
will want to see as many beads as I need to be certain’). Although, altering the 
implementation intention may have improved effectiveness in the present study, 
it would raise questions about the clinical applicability given an intervention 
needs to be flexible enough to cover a range of scenarios faced by people with 
delusions.      
 
Clinical Implications 
Any clinical implications drawn from this study must be done so with caution 
given that the findings lack clarity and are vulnerable to the limitations described 
above. However, the formation of implementation intentions did increase the 
amount of information requested on the beads task. Although this was not 
significant, it suggests that implementation intentions may have the potential to 
reduce the JTC bias in people experiencing delusions. It could be argued that 
people with delusions do encounter difficulties in goal striving and JTC may 
reflect difficulty in disengaging from a failing course of action. Certainly, 
participants with high paranoia benefitted more from forming an implementation 
intention, albeit only on the survey task.  
  
The impact of colour on task performance has interesting possibilities for how 
interventions addressing the JTC bias are delivered. It appears that when 
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cognitive demands are high, the colour red is associated with more caution and 
therefore less hasty decision-making. If this finding is replicated in further 
research with clinical samples, then presenting written interventions (e.g., ‘flash 
cards’) in red might enhance effectiveness.      
 
Further Research 
The potential clinical implications of this study are dependent on further 
research exploring the effectiveness of implementation intentions in reducing 
the JTC bias, because the present findings lack clarity. The JTC bias appears to 
be more pronounced where participants are currently experiencing delusions. 
Therefore, future studies should explore implementation intentions in clinical 
samples because there is more scope to demonstrate effectiveness. The 
present study also emphasises how task manipulations interact and impact on 
the amount of information requested on probabilistic reasoning tasks. Future 
studies would benefit from reducing the complexity of the task (e.g., employing 
the beads task using one ratio only) in the first instance before systemically 
varying the tasks to better understand the effectiveness of implementation 
intentions. Should implementation intention prove to be effective on 
experimental, probabilistic reasoning tasks, consideration should be given to 
how this brief, cost-effective, intervention can be adapted and developed for use 
in clinical practice with people experiencing delusions.     
 
The present study demonstrates the complexities involved in investigating the 
JTC bias. The interactions between task manipulations might account for some 
of the discrepancies in the JTC literature and should be considered in future 
research. In particular, the colour of the beads employed surprisingly emerged 
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as a significant factor. This finding certainly needs replicating to reliably draw 
any firm conclusions. However, the design of future studies should consider the 
choice of coloured beads carefully and analyse the impact of colour on the 
dependent measure employed. Further, studies would benefit from considering 
the relationship between IQ and performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks.     
 
Although a number of factors could explain the absence of the JTC bias in the 
present sample, there are still only three studies to date considering JTC in non-
clinical, paranoid, samples. If we are to employ non-clinical samples to make 
inferences about the experiences of individuals with persecutory beliefs it is 
important that we first understand how the JTC bias relates specifically to 
persecutory delusions. Comparing the JTC bias by delusional subtype is a 
neglected area in the JTC literature (Freeman, 2007). This is particularly 
important given the impact different delusional beliefs may have on reasoning 
(McKay et al., 2007).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present study failed to replicate the finding that JTC is demonstrated by 
non-clinical participants with high levels of paranoia. Therefore, the study does 
not support the assertion that JTC contributes to the formation of delusions or is 
specific to persecutory subtypes. Further, the study failed to replicate the 
exacerbation of JTC in response to rushing. However, task difficulty did impact 
on performance with more information requested as the difficulty of the task 
increased. Interestingly, where the colour of the dominant bead in the first jar 
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presented was red more information was requested, indicating that red is 
associated with more cautious reasoning, particularly where cognitive demands 
are high (i.e., when the task is more difficult). Varying the emotional salience of 
the task did affect performance. More information was requested on the 
emotionally salient task compared to the neutral task only in the high paranoia 
group. However, it is likely that the effectiveness of implementation intentions 
can account for this finding.  
 
The effectiveness of implementation intentions was not conclusive. The non-
significant trend in the data suggested that forming an implementation intention 
did result in reduced hastiness, but only on the beads task. Implementation 
intentions appeared to most effective when the task was difficult or where 
participants may experience difficulties in goal striving (i.e., when paranoia is 
high). The findings should be viewed with caution given the limitations inherent 
within the study. Further research is needed to better understand how task 
manipulations influence the JTC bias, clarify the role of JTC in the formation of 
delusions and the specificity to persecutory beliefs, and to more reliably 
demonstrate the effectiveness of implementation intentions.   
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